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Aristotle’s Arguments and his Audiences
in Metaphysics Ζ 4
Preliminary Studies on Audience-Driven Dynamics in Aristotle
Gyburg Uhlmann
1 Introduction
In this paper1 I approach a simple question or rather two simple questions and
discuss them in a paradigmatic case study from the Corpus Aristotelicum: Is
it likely that Aristotle conducted philosophy alone? This question is entangled
with another related question-spectrum: who were his audiences and how did
the audiences contribute to the writings that are extant today in the Corpus
Aristotelicum? The material usually considered in order to answer the first question
are not the treatises of the Corpus Aristotelicum but the biographical sources,
peripatetic and anti-peripatetic narratives, and letters and fragments from the
published works (etc.).2
This does not come as a surprise, however the ignorance or limited interest in
the treatises of the Corpus Aristotelicum in regard to questions of the historical
contextualization of Aristotle and his philosophical practices, have proven harmful
for a full and consistent understanding of Aristotle in his time and contexts. It
is because of this constricted approach that the second question – about the
impact that Aristotle’s audiences had on his philosophy – has never been seriously
addressed. The limited interest also goes hand in hand with the construction of an
antagonism between Aristotle’s political life and the merely scientific or academic
life of Aristotle, the encyclopedic scientist and reader, as if the communication
practices, the social networks in which Aristotle worked and studied, his students
and fellow researchers were not part of the social and political life in Athens and
1I am grateful to Carolyn Kelly for correcting linguistic weaknesses of an earlier draft of this
paper.
2The material is available thanks to the scholarly work of Eduard Zeller, Ulrich von Wilamo-
witz-Möllendorff, W.D. Ross (Aristotle, New York/London 1923-95), Werner Jaeger, Ingemar Düring,
A.-H. Chroust, Paul Moraux and Hans Gottschalk (among others). A concise critique can be found
in Carlo Natali, Aristotle: His Life and School, ed. in English by D. Hutchinson, Princeton 2013,
135-151.
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did not involve Aristotle in practices beyond the restricted scope of teaching and
research inside the walls of the Academy, Lykeion or other discussion circles.
The artificial character of this distinction becomes obvious when reconsidering
the aporiai into which scholars of the 19th and early 20th centuries fell in their
dispute about Aristotle’s political activities: 1. It proved impossible to clearly
distinguish times during Aristotle’s lifetime in which his writings mirror his
political concern from those in which he withdraw from every political agenda
whatsoever, or to distinguish writings that are clearly politically entangled in the
current political debates and conflicts, from those that are not. 2. Neither the
subordination of the political or, so to speak, external biography to a spiritual
biography (Gomperz, Jaeger)3 nor the subordination or marginalization of his
philosophical activities to and against his political scope and freedom of action
(Bernays,4 Wilamowitz,5 Gercke6) turned out to be compatible with the texts and
biographical material.
Therefore, the presupposed notion of political and historical context needs to
be revisited. Ingemar Düring’s Quellenkritik has prepared the ground for a more
open and pluralized social and political contextualization, since Düring situated
every biographical reference or story about Aristotle in its particular institutional
context and affiliation with a certain school tradition or tradition of thought and
focused on the particular intentions and uses of the narratives.7
However, Düring does not apply this principle of consistent contextualiza-
tion to his examination of Aristotle’s writing in search of indirect biographical
evidence (which takes him only seven pages),8 but deduces Aristotle’s attitude
towards life in general and his own intellectual life in particular from concepts
and philosophical theories of the treatises. Here, he finds Aristotle promoting
the concept of the life of contemplation (‘bios theoretikos’)9 as his own reci-
pe for the utmost happiness, endowed with a passion for truth and a sense of
tolerance (etc.).
Yet Düring makes no attempt to analyze the philosophical practices themselves
3E.g. Theodor Gomperz, Die Akademie und ihr vermeintlicher Philomacedonismus. Bemerkungen
zu Bernays’ Phokion, in: Wiener Studien 4, 1882, 102-120; Werner Jaeger, Aristoteles. Grundlegung
einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, Berlin: Weidemannsche Buchhandlung 1923 (translated into
English as Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development, trans. by R. Robinson,
Oxford 1934, 2nd ed. Oxford 1948, repr. 1962).
4J. Bernays, Phokion und seine neueren Beurteilers, Berlin 1881.
5Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, Berlin 1966 (first published in
1881); Platon, Berlin 1919 (2 vls.).
6A. Gercke, s.v. Aristoteles, in: R.E. 2, 1896, coll. 1012-1054.
7Ingemar Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition, Göteborg 1957.
8Düring 1957, 366-372
9Carlo Natali – following and further developing Düring – has placed the bios theoretikos in the
center of his narrative on Aristotle’s life: Natali 2013, esp. 72-95.
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as they are performed in the different treatises and transmitted in the Corpus
Aristotelicum in a particular way or to contextualize the argumentational and
disputational situations in the contexts for which they are designed and in which
they can reach their audiences.
Düring also did not overcome the dichotomy between political and intellectual
life in his otherwise innovative interpretation: According to Düring Aristotle was
neither a political protagonist nor an influential teacher and intellectual but an
isolated individual ahead of his time in a rather hostile anti-intellectual, anti-Ma-
cedonian, xenophobic environment. Especially in his comparison of Aristotle with
Plato, traces of Jaeger’s and Wilamowitz’ spiritual biography become dominant
in Düring’s biographical narrative, which retells the story of the rational or even
rationalistic scholar who was intellectually nourished by the empirical philosophy
of the Ionian tradition, and whose thinking – in contrast to Plato – was not built
by the intercommunication between a group of disputants and their philosophical
inspiration but who was rather content with being thrown back on himself and his
engagement in books and with books.10
Carlo Natali in his excellent review of the biographical texts, follows Düring
in this respect and imagines Aristotle as a rational scholar who lived in and with
a culture of experts without being dependent, in his conduct of philosophical
life, on the presence of his fellow researchers.11 His look at the treatises of
the Corpus Aristotelicum is because of this perspective primarily focussed on
Aristotle’s references to earlier thinkers and on his concept of a theoretical
life, which according to Natali is Aristotle’s intellectual legacy for centuries to
come.12
However, the logical next steps after Düring’s new insight in the dependence
of the “sources” (which are in fact literary texts with their own agenda and
story line) on the historical contexts and his pluralizing reading of Aristotle’s
philosophical positions and references to Plato during his lifetims are (1) the
analysis of the argumentational structure and practices in the treatises of the
Corpus Aristotelicum and (2) the application of a broad and comprehensive concept
of political and social contexts in which Aristotle was involved and involved
himself by (and not: instead of or as an alternative to) doing philosophy. For, if we
read the arguments in Aristotle as addressed to certain audiences and readers and
as induced or influenced by discussions and questions from his audiences, the
necessarily intuitive13 conception of a spiritual history and inner scheme of life
10Düring 1957, 460-461.
11Natali 2013, 64-71.
12Natali 2013, 72-95.
13Cf. Günther Patzig, “Furchtbare Abstraktionen”. Zur irrationalistischen Interpretation der
griechischen Philosophie im Deutschland der 20er Jahre, in: R. von Thadden (ed.), Die Krise des
Liberalismus zwischen den Weltkriegen, Göttingen 1978, 193-210 [reprint in: Günther Patzig,
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as we find it in Jaeger and others can be replaced. The intuition and “Einfühlung”
in the historical person Aristotle becomes necessary only under the premise
that one disregards the writings of the Corpus Aristotelicum for the purpose of
biographical studies and at the same time uses them implicitly as the backbone
of the narrative about the intellectual life or development of the philosopher
Aristotle.
Since the philosophical texts in the proper sense of the word would have to be
omitted, the lack of sufficient reasons would have to be met.14
How much an analysis of the treatises themselves could add when one aims
at a consistent contextualizing of Aristotle doing philosophy in the institutional
and social contexts in which he was involved becomes evident by a re-analysis of
fragment 668 (Rose) and its history of interpretation. The fragment consists of one
sentence which the grammarian Demetrios in his treatise On style (peri hermeneias)
quotes from one of Aristotle’s letters to the Macedonian politician Antipater in
order to illustrate that even an expression taken from everyday language can have
an elegant effect in style.
“for as much as I was by myself and alone-living, I became rather loquacious”
ὅσῳ γὰρ αὐτίτης καὶ µονώτης εἰµί, φιλοµυθότερος γέγονα. (Frg. 668 (Rose))
In this fragment Aristotle uses one rarely documented word (monotes (‘alone-li-
ving’)) and one made-up word (autites (‘by oneself-being’)) in order to apologize
for the length of his letter (philomythoteros, which means ‘loquacious’ here (rat-
her than ‘friend of myths’)). ‘Please excuse me for writing so longish, that’s what
happens if you are by yourself. People get loquacious.’
Werner Jaeger has interpreted this fragment15 without respect to context
and function just in the same way as Cicero’s remark in a letter about having a
small bed (lecticulum) resulted in interpretations about the shortness of his body,
although in the context it is used as an instrument for appearing a humble and
Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. III: Aufsätze zur antiken Philosophie, Göttingen 1996, 273-294].
14This holds true if one does not wish to relegate the philosopher Aristotle to a person that
is completely detached from this philosophical legacy as Anton-Hermann Chroust suggested:
Anton-Hermann Chroust is an interesting case in this respect because he has been an advocate for
the radical separation of the published writings from the unpublished school writings and of a
political Aristotle of the early published writings from the character Aristotle, whose contours
disappear in the dominance of a school tradition. The Corpus Aristotelicum as we have it today
is, according to Chroust, a product of the first outstanding figures of the later Peripatos who
are supposedly the authors of Aristotle’s school texts. Chroust (just like scholars with such
different opinions as Jaeger, Düring, and Natali) does not use the potential of the school writings
to contextualize Aristotle socially, intellectually and politically. Instead, he disentangles the extant
writings from the person Aristotle and his political and social contexts. Cf. Anton-Hermann
Chroust, Aristotle, Metaphysics 981 b 13-25: A Fragment of the Aristotelian on Philosophy, in:
Rheinisches Museum 120, 1977.
15Werner Jaeger 1923, 342.
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modest host (Cic. Ad fam.VII.1.5.10). Jaeger suggested reading the letter-fragment
(without any further context) as evidence of a lonesome Aristotle spending a
good time cheerfully delving into the wonders of myth.16 Nothing of this fancy
empathy is even likely17, but a product of the conjectures from a general vision of
Aristotle’s personality and mood in this stage of his life.
In any case it disregards the apologetic and momentary strategy behind the
expressions.18 We also have to take into account the (presumable) relationship
that Aristotle had with Antipater, who was one of the closest henchmen and even
intimate of Philip II, and later a governor in Macedonia in the service of Alexander
the Great.19
In his letters to Antipater Aristotle repeatedly expressed criticism about social
and political instability in Athens and an atmosphere of fear due to sycophants
(Frg. 667 (Rose, 3rd edition)) thereby satisfying anti-Athenian resentments in
Macedonia. On the basis of these letters Aristotle has been suspected of having
given intelligence reports on a regular basis to Antipater about the situation
in Athens.20 This relation might also have encouraged Aristotle to rather place
emphasis on problems in social contacts and communication in his personal life.
It is noteworthy that Demetrius reflects on the need to use a plain style in letters
and refers to examples from Aristotle’s letters to Antipater in which he spoke
rather pompously21 in such a way, as Demetrius puts it, in which nobody would
ever write to his friend. His style in these letters resembles rather a speech-style
and is not taken from everyday language.
Considering this characteristic of Aristotle’s letters to Antipater, or at least
some of them, it becomes unlikely to imagine Aristotle in an intimate conversation
with a close friend to whom he opens his heart and confesses his deep-felt
loneliness. Therefore, it cannot be regarded directly as a personal document with
autobiographical significance.
16Jaeger 1923, 342: “Mitten im geräuschvollen Hause altert ein ganz für sich Lebender, ein
Einsiedler, nach einem eignen Ausdruck ein in sich zurückgezogenes Ich, das sich in seinen
heiteren Stunden einspinnt in die tiefsinnige Wunderwelt des Mythischen. Die herb verschlossene
Persönlichkeit, nach außen streng verborgen hinter den starrenden Wällen des Wissens, taucht
hier auf und lüftet den Schleier des Geheimnisses.”
17Cf. Patzig 1978, 289.
18Cf. E. N. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, Stockholm 1977, 44-47 (on Wilamowitz’ reading of
Plato’s seventh letter).
19Cf. Aristoteles, Die historischen Fragmente, ed. by Christof Rapp, Berlin 2002, 290; Waldemar
Heckel, The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire, London/New York, 1992.
20Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle Returns to Athens in the Year 335 B.C., in: Laval théologique
et philosophique 23, Numéro 2, 1967, 244-254.
21Demetrius, § 225 (G.M.A. Grube, A Greek Critic. Demetrius on Style, Toronto 1961), cf. Hans-Jo-
sef Klauck, Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis, Waco 2006,
184-188.
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There is no reason whatsoever22 to conjecture images about Aristotle’s time
commitment to his communication with Antipater or other individuals in Macedo-
nia. Instead we should connect the fragment with the reasonable assumption that
Aristotle in these years was intensely involved in the teaching and philosophical
discussions on issues in first philosophy, Physics, or other subparts of the natural
sciences including biological studies. The evidence of the existence of this text
material and its probably and widely-accepted23 terminus post quem (sc. after
Aristotle’s second arrival in Athens after his sojourn in Assos and Mytilene) should
be the starting point and premises for the interpretation of the decontextualized
small letter-fragment. Therefore, we need to study the way in which Aristotle in
his writings proves to be involved in debates and how he communicates with his
audiences and fellow researchers.
For, directing one’s attention to the audiences and readerships of Aristotle’s
extant treatises not only provides access to new details of his philosophical
practices – and answers as to whether or not Aristotle did philosophy alone and
who were his audiences – but will also help to solve philosophical and historical
aporiai about particular (crucial) passages in the Corpus Aristotelicum. This new
horizon is especially fruitful in cases where other traditional approaches have
proven to be insufficient.
In this paper, my paradigmatic case study for this is chapter 4 in book Ζ of
the Metaphysics.24
2 Metaphysics Ζ and Audience-Driven Dynamics
Metaphysics Ζ has puzzled ancient and still puzzles modern commentators and
scholars. This holds true in regard to the general structure and text variants but
especially simply in regard to the interpretation of single sentences and arguments.
They often seem to be stringed together rhapsodically and obscurely because
of very short expressions and elliptic constructions. There is a close connection
between the rhetorics, i.e. the communication practices that Aristotle uses, and the
understanding of the very content of the argument, the underlying philosophical
premises, and the dynamics of philosophy itself.
Since Ps.-Alexander’s commentary, and in any of the most important contribu-
tions to the discussion in the 20th and 21st century – by Werner Jaeger (Studien
22And no sufficient reason to postulate the full and only authorship of treatises of the Corpus
for Aristotle’s students and fellow researchers (cf. Chroust a.a.o.).
23Natali 2013, 55-60; cf. D.L. V.10; Dinoys. Hal. First Letter to Ammaeus 5.3.
24Followed by a second paper on Metaphysics Z 5: Gyburg Uhlmann, School Examples and
Curricular Entanglements in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, other Pragmateiai, and Plato’s Theaetetus:
The Case of the Snub Nose, in: Working Papers des SFB Episteme in Bewegung, Working Paper No.
10, 2017.
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zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Berlin 1912), W.D. Ross
(Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Vol. I-II, Oxford 1924), Joseph Owens (The Doctrine of
Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto 1951-1978), Pierre Aubenque (Le
problème de l’être chez Aristote, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1962),
Michael Frede and Günther Patzig (Frede, Michael and Patzig, Günther. Aristote-
les ‘Metaphysik Z’. Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar (in 2 volumes), München:
C.H.Beck 1988 (=Frede/Patzig)), Myles Burnyeat (A Map of Metaphysics Zeta, Pitts-
burgh: Mathesis Publications, 2001), and Stephen Menn – different perspectives
have been applied in order to settle the question of the internal connection and
relation of the chapters and arguments.
In this paper I will present a different perspective that can be useful to answer
structural questions together with questions concerning what Aristotle says about
substance, being etc., and test it by using it as a method to understand Ζ 4 – in its
context and in relation to Ζ as a whole and other books from the Metaphysics and
other pragmateiai).
The guiding hypothesis is that argumentations in Metaphysics Ζ are also
determined by the audiences that Aristotle addresses and with which he disputed
the topics under consideration. This means that the single approaches to the
meaning of ‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti ên einai), i.e. the very being of an object should not
be considered as a continuous argumentational sequence but as questions and
answers that are asked and addressed in regard to certain people with particular
preconditions or momentary perspectives.
Some arguments presuppose and address the terminology of the Analytics,
some terms are taken from the Topics, some of them address questions that are
similarly addressed in the Physics. This does not necessarily mean that these
treatises – as they have been transmitted and as they are extant today – must be
presupposed in terms of the chronology of text production. But it means that Ari-
stotle refers to arguments and discussions which led to the texts of these treatises
as we have them today.25 It is a process of arguing and answering, questioning
and revising which is spurred by audiences’ intended or actual previous studies,
interests, and acquired logical tools and which therefore does not proceed as a
continuous single line of argument or as two distinct levels of arguments in a
certain architecture (Burnyeat) but in an argumentational room in which several
approaches to one question in regard to several aspects and related topics are
tested like waves that beat repeatedly against the shore and which finally serve
one and the same task.
In the audience-action-perspective we can observe Aristotle and his audiences
didactically approaching and re-approaching certain aspects of his and their
questions again and again and with slightly different perspectives and in regard
25In accordance with Burnyeat 2001, 24, fn. 34.
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to different properties and insights on relations, without the need to uncover a
persistent one-directional or (multilevel-, but consecutively related) structure.
Analyzing the structure of arguments and their contexts, however, does not
excuse the interpreter from dealing with the philosophical questions and does
not allow him or her to be content with only stylistic or structural insights.26 In
contrast, to read Metaphysics Ζ as a dialogue with the school audiences means
to answer crucial questions like: What is Aristotle’s (main) question? What are
the substances (ousiai)? Is there something like an individual substance (ousia)?
The communication strategies that elucidate school practices in the Lykeion and
Academy are bound to specific arguments and their philosophical meaning. They
not only have the effect that the text seems to be more lively27 – perhaps that is
not even the case – but they hint directly at the didactic laboratory in which and
with which Aristotle developed his philosophy.
Scholarship is increasingly aware of the dynamics of different versions of the
text of the Metaphysics and the reciprocity between oral lectures given by Aristotle
and written treatises. However, what has not been considered or addressed so far
is the fact that Aristotle’s arguments testify to audiences’ input and disputational
practices. The task of this paper is to use this perspective as a method in order to
understand what Aristotle is actually saying inMetaphysics Ζ 4.
3 The arguments of Ζ 4
Ζ 4 addresses the question: how, by starting from the sensible substances (ou-
siai),28 do we understand what something that we speak of is in respect of itself
(kath’auto). Aristotle calls his method ‘logical’ and uses the tools from the Catego-
ries just as he did in chapter 3 – without calling it like that – while dealing with the
option that the substratum (hypokeimenon) is the primary being. To argue logically
means29 herein to deal with forms of predication. Subject/substratum is that of
26Cf. the otherwise useful study of Ralf Lengen: Form und Funktion der aristotelischen Pragmatie,
Stuttgart 2002, in which the author limits himself only to formal questions and reflections.
27cf. Lengen 2002, 39.
28I follow in my reading of Ζ 4 the recontruction of the text by Bonitz, Jaeger and Ross,
who positioned 1029b1-2 after 1029b3-12, where Aristotle explained the didactic order of the
topics which he is going to discuss: starting with the sensible substances and contemplating
non-sensible substances on the basis of this understanding. Cf. Frede/Patzig, II, 54; and cf. the
reference to non-sensible substances in Ζ 16 and 17 (esp. 1041a7-9) and Ζ 11, 1037a13-17. Cf.
also Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 347-348 on the scope of
Metaphysics Ζ which studies “sensible entities as the means of arriving at a higher and absolutely
more knowable type.”
29Lucas Angioni, Definition and Essence in Aristotle’s Metaphysics vii 4, in: Ancient Philosophy
34, 2014, 75-100 analyzes Aristotle’s use of logikôs; cf. also Michail Peramatzis, Aristotle’s ‘Logical’
Level of Metaphysical Investigation, in: The Aristotelian Tradition: Aristotle’s Works on Logic and
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which everything else is said. In Ζ 4 he talks about what is said of something in
respect of itself (kath’auto) because this is the name (onoma) that signifies the ti
ên einai, the ‘what-it-is-to-be(-something)’.
Ps.-Alexander remarks on this starting passage of Ζ 4 that there is a lack
of articulateness (saphêneia: Alex.Aphr. in Metaph. 467,10-27 (resp. -19)) and
identifies this lack in the condensing briefness of his diction, which interfuses the
logical level of predication with the ontological level of being (hyparxis). Aristotle
defines the ti ên einai by saying that it is what is said of each thing in respect to
itself (per se, kath’auto). Later in the chapter he states explicitly that in defining
something, it is the logos30 that signifies the ‘what-it-is-to-be-something’ (ti ên
einai), i.e. not the ti ên einai is said of something but a word or speech that signifies
the ti ên einai. For example: the word ‘man’ (anthropos) signifies the ti ên einai of
Socrates because it is said of Socrates per se (kath’auto).
This obscurity or lack of articulateness has a fundamentum in re and in theory:
Aristotle’s theory of predication depends on ontological distinctions, for the
question of whether something can be said of something (as a logical predicate)
depends on the question of whether it belongs to something else as an ontological
property, i.e. whether it is an ontological predicate. As Jonathan Lear has pointed
out, Aristotle’s method of scientific proof implies that only such predications that
reveal the metaphysical structure (i.e. the ontological relation between subject
and predicate of the proposition) of a thing can be taken as real predications in
the strict sense and can be the premises of a scientific proof.31 In Ζ Aristotle goes
beyond the scope of the Categories and not only describes our way of talking
about and addressing things, but analyzes which kind of predication (language),
i.e. relating terms to each other, is adequate to the properties that are signified by
the terms, and which kind is not.
If we thus ask which passage is characterized as logical (logikôs)32 by the
Metaphysics and Their Reception in the Middle Ages, ed. by Börje Bydén and Christina Thomsen,
Thörnqvist Papers in Mediaeval Studies, PIMS: 2017, 81-130 (and cf. also his earlier work: Aristotle’s
Metaphysics Z.4: Criteria for Definition and Essence and Their Relation to the Posterior Analytics
A.4, Deukalion, 24/1, June 2006, 5-30).
30Cf. Frede/Patzig, I, 20.
31Jonathan Lear, Aristotle and Logical Theory, Cambridge 1980, 31. Antonio Mesquita in discus-
sing Lukasiewicz refers to that passages and underlines the correctness of Aristotle’s expressions
when he is talking about properties or individuals that are predicated of something (António Pedro
Mesquita Types of Predication in Aristotle (Posterior Analytics I 22), in: Journal of Ancient Philoso-
phy VI/2, 2012, 1-27, 21); however, he ignores the fact that Aristotle sometimes speaks completely
accurately (and therefore, in a cumbersome way) while he in other cases speaks less accurately but
more comfortably. On the centrality of the difference between ontological and predicational or
even linguistic cf. Michael J. Loux, Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z and H.
Ithaca/London 1991, 78 who argues in favor of a linguistic understanding of 1029b13 (logikôs).
32Burnyeat 2001, 19-24 building on Simp. in Ph. 440,19-441,2 who presents three different
meanings of logikôs.
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expression in 1029b13 and up to which part of the text Aristotle argues solely
logically – without any concern for ontological relations – there is not only one
answer, and it is therefore reasonable to follow different tracks concerning that
issue,33 while keeping in mind that each of them will not be exclusively valid.
Rather, Aristotle simply does what he has announced just before: he starts with
what is easier to understand (1029b3-12) and that is the level of predication, i.e.
the way we talk about things.34
The aim of these negotiations and accesses is to get a grip on what single
things are in themselves and as themselves. What is it to be Socrates? What is it
to be a man? What is it to be a white man? Answers to these questions do not
come from discussions about (modes of) predications but from predications that
signify properties and from definitions of words that signify objects of knowledge.
Therefore, Aristotle does not refrain from predicational and logical inquiries in
the last part of Ζ 4 or in the following chapters Ζ 5 and 6 and until the end of Ζ
(even in Ζ 1735) or the whole books Ζ,Η,Θ,36 (and does not only start with it in Ζ 4,
but already in Ζ 1) but starts over with and re-introduces logical or predicational37
approaches each time it is required by the current question, task, or by a request
from the audience.
Every single question, implicit or explicit objection, and argument originates
from other argumentational contexts of which we find traces in the extant treatises
and which can be backtracked to school discussions in the Lykeion, but each
passage and argument for different reasons. In his “Map to Metaphysics Z”38
Myles Burnyeat suggests the distinction between two separate or fairly separate
levels of argument in Z. This interpretation can be further developed by applying
the idea of didactically motivated and structured approaches to the topic under
consideration not only of larger text passages but of every single argument and the
approaching and re-approaching of the pivotal questions again and again.
This also needs to be considered in view of the well-known fact that Aristotle
in Ζ 4 does not point to the matter-form-distinction and does not use it as a
tool for the analysis of ‘what-it-is-to-be-something’. This fact has led to analytical
positions and to Burnyeat’s two-level- and non-linearity-thesis and directs other
33Burnyeat argues that the whole of Ζ 4-6 (and further parts of Z) is characterized as logical and
builds a logical level on its own, while for Michael Woods it is only Ζ 4, 102913-22; Peramatzis
2017 summarizes scholarship on this issue and presents own observations on the pervading
relation between ontology and logical approach in Metaphysics Ζ 4 (passim).
34On the relationship between ontology and logic cf. the Heideggerian approach by Pierre
Aubenque 1962, 133.
35Peramatzis 2017, passim and 28 points out that the argumentation about causality and
matter-form-distinction is based on the logical inquiries.
36W.D. Ross, II, 166 and 168 argues that Aristotle ends the logical considerations in 1030a27.
37Peramatzis 2017, 8-9 and passim.
38Burnyeat 2001, passim and esp. 87 and ff. in regard to Ζ 4-6.
10
approaches, too.39
To be sure, not every new approach and new start is marked equally as such by
Aristotle; there is a gradually different similarity and separateness of the particular
pathways to answering the questions under discussion. But, just as there is a close
connection even between the ‘big’ cuts such as in Ζ 1740 (“What and what kind
of thing one needs to say that the substance is, we want to say by making quasi
another start.” Ζ 17, 1041a6-7) to the preceding argumentations,41 there is also a
difference between the argumentational parts that are more closely connected to
each other. Each approach contributes something specific42 to the clarification of
the question under discussion and is therefore connected to the other parts and
refers to them implicitly (or explicitly).43
4 Running analysis of the school practices in Meta-
physics Ζ 4
It is therefore necessary to follow the arguments step by step – by taking up all
major contributions to the understanding of this piece of text in its present text
context.
4.1 ‘Educated’ (mousikos) as example for accidental predicati-
on
In 1029b14-18 Aristotle uses ‘educated’ (mousikos) as an example which he rei-
terates in the logical treatises, the Metaphysics, and the Physics for a otherwise
unspecified accidental predication (kata symbebekos).44 In Ζ 4 ‘educated’ (mou-
sikos) draws on that and, in our context, is presupposed to be a property that is
not predicated kath’auto. “For, to be you is not the same as to be educated, since
39Peramatzis 2017, 8; Burnyeat 2001, 7-8.
40On the entanglement between Ζ 17 and the Posterior Analytics see Frank A Lewis, How Aristotle
gets by in Metaphysics Zeta, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013.
41Michael Frede and Günther Patzig, Aristoteles ‘Metaphysik Z’, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar,
Bd. 2: Kommentar, München 1988, 308 point at the multiple connections of the chapter with the
preceding ones.
42Although not necessarily new or totally different from other arguments.
43The perspective in this paper adds to Burnyeat’s interpretation and gives an explanation
for the non-linearity and the connectedness of the different levels and approaches through a
contextualization of Aristotle’s philosophical practices in his school discussions and by taking
into account the active part of the audiences.
44de int. 21a11; Metaph. 1007b4-5; b14-15; 1015b16-22; and esp. 29-34; ; 1017a6-22; 1018b34-35;
APo 73b4-5; Mechanica 856a34-35; Ph. 189b34-191a3; differently used by relating to the common
usage: GC 334a10-12; etc.
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your are not educated according to your being you.” (“οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σοὶ εἶναι
τὸ µουσικῷ εἶναι οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ µουσικός.”). Aristotle does not have to
argue for that but can use it as a premise.45
In the Physics Aristotle uses the example ‘educated’ (mousikos) together with
‘man’ (anthropos) in the context of the analysis of changes in the sensible world
(Ph. 189b34-191a3). The foremost aim of this distinction is the insight that we do
not have to distinguish between two but between three principles of change: the
substratum (hypokeimenon), the form (eidos) or shape (morphê) and the lack of
form or shape (which is the opposite of the form).
“As we do not say from being a man he came to be musical but only the man
became musical. When a simple thing is said to become something, in one case
it survives through the process, in the other it does not. For the man remains a
man and is such even when he becomes musical, whereas what is not musical or is
unmusical does not survive, either simply or combined with the subject. [...] For to
be a man is not the same as to be unmusical.” (Ph. I, 7, 190a7-12 and 17, transl. R.
P. Hardie/R. K. Gaye) 46
The logical distinction between substantial and accidental predication, therefore, is
not and cannot be developed in the Physics but must be presupposed. In the logical
treatises, especially in the Analytics, we find many passages where this distinction
is exemplified with the educated-man- (mousikos-anthropos-) conjunction.
“Likewise also in the case of ‘Coriscus’and ‘Coriscus the musician’– are they the
same or different? For the one signifies an individual and the other a quality, so
that it cannot be isolated; though it is not isolation which creates the third man,
but the admission that it is an individual. For what man is cannot be an individual,
as Callias is.” (SE 178b39-179a5, transl. Pickard) 47
As in On Interpretation, ‘educated’ (mousikos) (de int. 21a8-10) in the Sophistici
Elenchi is a common example for accidental predication that does not need to be
introduced as such.48
By choosing this example in Ζ 4 Aristotle addresses an audience that is ac-
quainted with predication theory and syllogistic as it is presented in the treatises
45For Aristotle’s use of examples as a school practice see Uhlmann 2017b.
46 οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώpiου ἐγένετο µουσικός, ἀλλ’ ἅνθρωpiος ἐγένετο µουσικός. τῶν δὲ γιγνοµένων
ὡς τὰ ἁpiλᾶ λέγοµεν γίγνεσθαι, τὸ µὲν ὑpiοµένον γίγνεται τὸ δ’ οὐχ ὑpiοµένον ὁ µὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωpiος
ὑpiοµένει µουσικὸς γιγνόµενος ἄνθρωpiος καὶ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ µὴ µουσικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄµουσον οὔτε ἁpiλῶς
οὔτε συντεθειµένον ὑpiοµένει. [...] οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἀνθρώpiῳ καὶ τὸ ἀµούσῳ εἶναι.
47ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐpiὶ τοῦ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος µουσικός, piότερον ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον· τὸ µὲν
γὰρ τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε σηµαίνει, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸ ἐκθέσθαι. οὐ τὸ ἐκτίθεσθαι δὲ piοιεῖ τὸν
τρίτον ἄνθρωpiον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅpiερ τόδε τι εἶναι συγχωρεῖν οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τόδε τι εἶναι, ὥσpiερ Καλλίας,
καὶ ὅpiερ ἄνθρωpiός ἐστιν.
48SE 176a1; 175b18-27; 179a1; 181a10-12.
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of the Organon and especially the Analytics (APo I, 22), which entitles him to
presuppose the use of mousikos as a paradigm for an accidental predication.49 In
the Posterior Analytics I,22 Aristotle introduces basic distinctions that are neces-
sary for the analysis of predication modes (but which go beyond the scope of the
Categories). He defines substantial and accidental predication (APo. 83a25-33)50
by using ‘white’ and ‘man’ in order to explain accidental predication. Interestingly,
Aristotle mentions Plato’s theory of forms and marks it as not relevant in this
regard (Apo. 83a31-34).
“We may at once dismiss Ideas; they are mere empty names, and if they do exist,
cannot concern our argument, for demonstrations deal only with subjects such
as we have already mentioned.” (Apo. I 22, 83a32-35, (transl.: Edmund Spencer
Bouchier))51
This reference points at an audience that is acquainted with Platonic theory and
its basic question (‘What is something in itself (and not insofar as it is a mere
predicate of something else as it is described in the Categories as our primary
way of addressing things)’ or ‘by what can something be identified as this or
that’).
Why does Aristotle mention this? There is no particular reason in his previous
argument, but it is not far-fetched in front of an audience that is acquainted with
Platonic theory to ask the question ‘what about defining accidentals as something
that can be grasped in respect of itself?’. There, it could have been introduced
by this audience itself or presented as a school exercise that asks ‘what about
the forms?’ In a context where Aristotle reveals the ontological relations that
are sometimes hidden or obscured by predication customs and corrects these
practices, it is striking that he rejects Plato’s approach so rudely, for it is one of
the main aims of Platonic theory of forms to uncover and correct such structures
(as Plato does in his 7th letter) just as Aristotle does here in the Analytics and
similarly in other treatises like his On the soul.
Aristotle’s side note marks a difference to the Platonic approach, namely the
insistence that everywhere in the sensible realm the existence of a thing, a tode ti, is
the basic precondition for any predication and ontological relation – a fundament
of his argumentative moves which Aristotle similarly makes in the Metaphysics
49Cf. Burnyeat 2001, 24-25 and 87-115.
50“What does not signify a substance but is said as something of a substratum that is neither,
what that is, nor what a single thing of that kind is, is called accidental, for example ‘white’ is
said of ‘man’. For man is neither what it is to be white nor what something white is, but, say, an
animal/animate being....” – ὅσα δὲ µὴ οὐσίαν σηµαίνει, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄλλου ὑpiοκειµένου λέγεται ὃ µὴ
ἔστι µήτε ὅpiερ ἐκεῖνο µήτε ὅpiερ ἐκεῖνό τι, συµβεβηκότα, οἷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώpiου τὸ λευκόν. οὐ
γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωpiος οὔτε ὅpiερ λευκὸν οὔτε ὅpiερ λευκόν τι, ἀλλὰ ζῷον ἴσως
51τὰ γὰρ εἴδη χαιρέτω τερετίσµατά τε γάρ ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν piρὸς τὸν λόγον ἐστίν αἱ γὰρ
ἀpiοδείξεις piερὶ τῶν τοιούτων εἰσίν.
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(e.g. Ζ 4, 1029b22-27). The fact, that talking about real singular things in the
sensible realm is the regular basis of our language and predication and the normal
use of syllogistic, justifies the general statement that everything that is said is
said of a substance, a tode ti. While Plato in the Timaeus52 and the 7th letter53
corrects the normal language and its predication practices, Aristotle here clarifies
the underlying fundamental rationale and corrects only such cases in which we
predicate something more or less loosely or negligently. He does so more precisely
and strictly in the Posterior Analytics where the scientific nature of a proof and the
status whether a proposition is true or false is at stake.
It is not at all evident from the Platonic corpus that Plato would have objected
to the position in the Posterior Analytics (APo. I 22, 83a25ff.), but the emphasis
is different: if we do as we do and predicate something like ‘white’ of a single
substance, like ‘this man’ or ‘this horse’, we also need to think of what we mean
when we say ‘white’ and distinguish it from everything that is not white. However,
Aristotle takes a different approach to the question and therefore denies the
adequacy of the Platonic sets of question for the present context (chaireto Apo.
83a34), which could have either anticipated or reported or reacted to an school
audience’s objection or request for clarification.
Regarding its tone (“We may at once dismiss Ideas; they are mere empty
names...”) the text is more likely to be imagined as a seminar in the Lykeion than
in the Academy and perhaps as a response to an address from the audience side,
suggesting a greater proximity. Even though Plato seems to have practiced the
freedom of opinion in his circles and among his students and followers,54 one
can hardly imagine Plato sitting next to Aristotle when he critizes his teacher
with such harsh words.55 Such practices of distinguishing the “new school” from
Platonic approaches can even be imagined to have contributed to generating a
school identity of the Lykeion.
In any case, in Ζ 4 the school examples, the multiplicity of questions and
(implicit and explicit) objections from different directions, the elliptic style that
expects the readers and audiences to supplement the argument with topics and
positions discussed frequently or on an almost curricular basis, and the confi-
dence with which Aristotle starts with advanced distinctions from the Organon56,
are clear-cut criteria that claim a contextualization in the institutional practices of
Aristotle’s school contexts, i.e. Academy and Lykeion. Moreover, the differences in
tone in regard to Platonic doctrines or concepts in the Metaphysics can be explai-
52Ti. 49c7-50b5
53Ep. VII, 343a-c.
54Natali 2013, 20-25.
55L. Lynch, Aristotle’s school. A Study of a Greek Educational Institution, Los Angeles/London,
1972, 47-67.
56Burnyeat 2001, 25.
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ned by the different audiences and contexts of the lectures and argumentations.57
If we distinguish between audiences who are familiar with Platonic discussion
practices and who are in favor of Academic approaches on the one hand, and
those audiences who are more reserved in relation to a or the Platonic theory
of forms on the other, then, aporiai and alleged discrepancies can be resolved
and rather harsh verbal attacks in answer to Platonic suggestions and concepts
can be explained by refering to the wish to distance the school context of the
Lykeion from their mother ‘country’, i.e. the Platonic Academy. Furthermore, if
the audience is not well acquainted with Platonic discussions and not advan-
ced in dialectics and ontological argumentations, there is no need to attempt to
explain the particular doctrinal differences, nor is it fruitful for the purpose of
understanding.
4.2 Defining ‘per se-predications’ and ‘what-it-is-to-be-some-
thing’
The presupposition of distinctions from the Analytics in Metaphysics Ζ 4 becomes
even more obvious in the following case where Aristotle specifies what he means
by ‘in respect of itself‘ (kath’auto) (1029b16: οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦτο piᾶν). This move is
motivated by an implicit objection that comes from a terminological distinction
that is regularly connected with another school example, namely the predicate
‘white¸ rq. This distinction presents another meaning of the term ‘kath’auto’ that
is not suitable for identifying the ‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti ên einai) of a thing, i.e. the
predication of something in a primary way such as ’white’ (or any other color)
is predicated in a primary way of the surface: ‘white’ belongs to the surface ‘in
respect of itself’ (kath’auto) but not as a defining property, for being a surface is
not identical with being white (1029b16-18).
In the extant treatises we find this mode of primary predication called
kath’auto-predication in the Metaphysics in book ∆, the so-called philosophi-
cal lexicon, and in the Physics;58 neither of these texts need to be chronologically
earlier than Ζ59; the evidence only proves that in the discussions about first
philosophy and physics, to which Aristotle implicitly refers, the distinctions bet-
ween substantial and accidental predication induce distinctions between different
57On the need for or advantage in introducing audiences as protagonists in the interpretation of
Aristotle’s arguments see below.
58Aristotle discusses per se predications and attributes also in the Posterior Analytics I 4
(73a34-bl6). (Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto
1951-1978, 349 connects this discussion with the reference to the Analytics in Metaphysics Ζ 12,
1037b8-9 which is more likely to point at APo II,10).) and introduces a strict sense of ‘per se’ on
which he can build the principle from which the demonstration can be deduced.
59Owens 1951-1978, 349.
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modes of being ‘in respect of itself’ (kath’auto).
“‘That in virtue of which’ has several meanings, (1) the form or substance of each
thing, e.g. that in virtue of which a man is good is the good itself, (2) the proximate
subject in which an attribute is naturally found, e.g. color in a surface. ‘That in
virtue of which’, then, in the primary sense is the form, and in a secondary sense
the matter of each thing and the proximate substratum of each.” (Metaph. ∆ ch. 18,
1022a15-19 and esp. 16 und 18-19, transl. Ross)60
In addition to the primary (protos) distinction Aristotle speaks about gradually
nearer or more distant accidentals.61 ‘White’ is said primarily of the surface and
secondarily of the body and tertiarily of man (etc.) (Ph. 210b4-5)
By considering these other cases it becomes clear that the distinction has
been developed primarily to settle questions about changing individual subjects
with different accidental and substantial properties, since nearer or more distant
predications do not imply indices for essential or non-essential properties. It is
thus transferred62 to our context63 and presupposed as a known perspective and
tool in order to further distinguish the meaning of certain predication practices
that are analyzed and systematized in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. The objection
is made by or for somebody who has learned to distinguish between different
modes of being-by-oneself (kath’auto einai). In this case, we cannot know for sure
whether such an objection is implicit or has been actually put forth, since Aristotle
does not name a discussion partner. However, in either case it is the audience that
pushes Aristotle’s argument and adds to the preceding not, so to speak, as the
natural or causal consequence but rather in the mode of encircling or orbiting the
case under consideration by applying different school distinctions.
Here, as always, we can ask: could Aristotle not have anticipated such an
objection or could he not have thought of it all by himself? Why do we need to
60Τὸ καθ’ ὃ λέγεται piολλαχῶς, ἕνα µὲν τρόpiον τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἑκάστου piράγµατος, οἷον
καθ’ ὃ ἀγαθός, (15) αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, ἕνα δὲ ἐν ᾧ piρώτῳ piέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον τὸ χρῶµα ἐν τῇ
ἐpiιφανείᾳ. τὸ µὲν οὖν piρώτως λεγόµενον καθ’ ὃ τὸ εἶδός ἐστι, δευτέρως δὲ ὡς ἡ ὕλη ἑκάστου καὶ
τὸ ὑpiοκείµενον ἑκάστῳ piρῶτον. Cf. Metaph. XII, 4, 1070b18-21.
61An accidental attribute may also be more or less remote, e.g. suppose that a pale man or a
musical man were said to be the cause of the statue. All causes, both proper and accidental, may
be spoken of either as potential or as actual... (Ph. 195b1-5, transl. Gaye/Hardie)
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν συµβεβηκότων ἄλλα ἄλλων piορρώτερον καὶ ἐγγύτερον, οἷον εἰ ὁ λευκὸς καὶ ὁ
µουσικὸς αἴτιος λέγοιτο τοῦ ἀνδριάντος. piάντα δὲ καὶ τὰ οἰκείως λεγόµενα καὶ τὰ κατὰ συµβεβη-
κὸς τὰ µὲν ὡς δυνάµενα λέγεται τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐνεργοῦντα,... (Ph. 195b1-5)
62By using the terms ‘new contextualization’ or ‘re-contextualization’ and ‘transfer’ I refer to
the terminological instruments that have been developed in the Collaborative Research Center
“Episteme in motion” (CRC 980) at the Freie Universität Berlin. The CRC 980 has supported this
paper by a financial aid for proof reading.
63A fact that becomes evident in that Aristotle mentions movement (kinesis) among the list of
categories, which is rather unusual: cf. Ross II, 169, ad 1029b25.
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introduce other protagonists? The answer to this must be: yes, he could have done
so, however, it is not likely that he did. For there is no evidence that Aristotle
was a lonely thinker. He was the most important part and head of a school64 and
philosophized as a teacher and co-researcher. Therefore, in cases in which we
find objections that are – logically – presented from the side and which embed
the philosophical question in a wider spectrum of concerns, or in cases in which
we find elliptic arguments that presuppose implications that are made obvious in
other contexts, it is not only plausible but directly inferable to describe Aristotle’s
philosophy as a dialogic school philosophy that is generated and further developed
by such objections that are raised as a side note.
We are especially compelled to hypothesize that the audiences actively partici-
pated if (and only if) these structural insights about school practices and all of
these contexts in other treatises prove directly helpful for the understanding of a
text such as Ζ 4.
In our current case: the question65 as to whether it is the surface that is to
be determined or the color white, can be settled by the principle of economy,
i.e. the premise that Aristotle uses the standard example in the standard way.
It is the surface that is to be determined, and of which it is shown that there
is no way in which ‘white’ could signify the ‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti ên einai) of the
surface.
This is supported by the following argumentation (1029b18 and ff.), which
makes clear that we cannot understand ‘white’ as signifying the ‘what-it-is-to-be’
(ti ên einai) of the surface. Aristotle tests another possible candidate that could
well have been induced by an objection of the audience: if ‘white’ does not signify
the ‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti ên einai) of the surface, perhaps ‘white surface’ could. The
justifying reason for this claim is that ‘surface’ and ‘white surface’ are not the
same (concerning their being as such). Aristotle only hints at the reason for this
by saying that the definiendum cannot be part of the definiens. When Aristotle
argues that the composite ‘white surface’ (epiphaneia leuke) cannot signify the
‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti ên einai) of the surface, he presupposes that ‘white surface’
(epiphaneia leuke) cannot be defined without using ‘surface’ (‘epiphaneia’) as
definiens. But why is that so?
The reason seems to be that ‘white’ has been introduced for the first time as
part of the definiens because in the school example it has by some means or other
a closeness to ‘surface’ (ephianeia). Aristotle is now making several attempts to
approach the question as to what kind of closeness this is and why it does not
work for defining the ti ên einai. The point here is that even in the conjunction, the
only term that could determine ‘surface’ still is ‘surface’ and not ‘white’. Therefore,
64Düring, 1957, 460; Chroust, cf. Natali 2013, 56-60.
65Frede/Patzig, 1988, II, 60-61.
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the only real defining element in the definition is ‘surface’, which is also the
definiendum, and this must be eliminated from the definition. The point therefore
is not that one cannot eliminate ‘surface’ by saying (e.g.) ‘termination (peras) of a
solid (soma)’ (cf. Eucl. XI,2, Definition EO IV, 2,4), but that there is no connection
between ‘surface’ and its defining elements on the one hand and ‘white’ and its
defining elements on the other.
Aristotle is more than succinct in making this point. He argues without having
introduced the principle of his argument properly but by presupposing it.66 Ever
since the ancient commentators this brevity has led to aporiai and different rea-
dings. Among them is an explanatory addition (“why” (dia ti)), which is transmitted
in two important manuscripts, E (Par.Graec. 1853) and J (Vindobonensis 100), and
was preferred or chosen by several modern editors67: This reading adds the que-
stion ‘why’ (sc. is ‘surface’ not what ‘white surface’ is, i.e. the ‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti
ên einai) of ‘white surface’).68
Here, it is helpful to refer to Ps.-Alexander’s explanation: he emphasizes
that in general the definition says and unfolds the ‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti ên einai)
of the definiendum (Alex.in Metaph.468,32-39). But ‘white’ cannot unfold the
‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti ên einai) of ‘surface’. If ‘white’ itself is unfolded, it is unfolded
in the parts of the definition of ‘white’ and not of ‘surface’. Aristotle omits to say
that ‘white’ is in no way part of the ‘what-it-is-to-be-surface’ (although it is closely
connected to it as a predicate) but presupposes the validity of this – elsewhere
introduced – case.
The very next sentence contains the next obscurity that is entangled with
the preceding, and which must be led back to an (implicit, anticipated) objecti-
on as Ps-Alexander suggests (469, 3-4): The absurdity of the effort to identify
‘what-it-is-to-be-white’ and ‘what-it-is-to-be-surface’ is made obvious by introdu-
cing ‘smooth’ (leios) as a second example for an accidental predication that is
said of the surface in a primary way but not as a definiens of its what-it-is-to-be
(ti ên einai). Again, we find traces of the use of ‘smooth’ as a school example in
∆ 11, 1018b34-1019a4,69 where Aristotle uses ‘smooth’ together with ‘surface’
in just the same way as (a) color (chroma) in Metaphysics ∆ 18. If we thus have
two standard examples for the usage of in respect-of-itself (kath’auto) instead of
66Pietsch implicitly considers this elliptic argumentation: Prinzipienfindung, 20.
67Frede/Patzig, 1988, I, 66.
68Cf. Alex.Aphr. in Metaph. 468,33-34.
69“The attributes of prior things are called prior, e.g. straightness is prior to smoothness; for one
is an attribute of a line as such, and the other of a surface. Some things then are called prior and
posterior in this sense, others in respect of nature and substance, i.e. those which can be without
other things, while the others cannot be without them—a distinction which Plato used.”
ἔτι piρότερα λέγεται τὰ τῶν piροτέρων piάθη, οἷον εὐθύτης λειότητος τὸ µὲν γὰρ γραµµῆς καθ’
αὑτὴν piάθος τὸ δὲ ἐpiιφανείας. τὰ µὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται piρότερα καὶ ὕστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ
οὐσίαν, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ ἐκείνων µή ᾗ διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο Πλάτων.
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‘in a primary way’, ‘smooth’ and ‘white’ have the same relationship to ‘surface’
and are both said in the same way ‘in a primary way’ (protos), i.e. kath’auto in
the sense of ‘in a primary way’ of ‘surface’. That means that they would have to
be identified/equated if one removed ‘surface’ from the parts of the definiens,
although they are not parts of the same definition.
Ross refers to De sensu (442b11)70 and Theophrastus, De sensu 13,71 where
Aristotle and Theophrastus report that Democritus identified ‘white’ and ‘smooth’
(Ross, II, 168). The argument in De sensu runs completely differently. Aristotle
argues against the absurdities that are elicited by the atomistic position that
everything in nature is caused by a collision of atoms. Democritus must deduce
everything in the senses from the sense of touch because the sense perception of
color, taste, sound etc. are actually perceptions of different shapes and positions
of atoms. Therefore, he even identifies ‘white’ and ‘smooth’ and reduces all colors
to geometric forms. Theophrastus discusses at length (De sensu 73-78 [contra:
79-83]) Democritus’ doctrines on colors and color sensation. In both texts it is
obvious that Democritus’ identification of ‘white’ and ‘smooth’ is not taken into
serious consideration. And: it does not touch upon the ontological question of
what it is to be something.
Although the use of ‘smooth’ in addition to ‘white’ can be explained by its func-
tion as an example for a primary predication, the explicit consequence (1029b22:
“... with the consequence that ‘what-it-is-to-be-white’ and ‘what-it-is-to-be-smooth’
are one and the same”) is very likely to be induced or further promoted by the
association with the example from the discussions about sense perception. For
only here has the identification of ‘white’ and ‘smooth’ been explicitly reduced
to absurdum. To be sure, this critique is aimed at the materialistic Democritean
theory of sense perception and not at defining ‘what-it-is-to-be-a-surface’, but
there is no reason why a school example that is at hand should not be transferred
70Sens. 442a29-442b26, cf. esp. a29-b3: “Democritus and most of the natural philosophers who
treat of sense-perception proceed quite irrationally, for they represent all objects of sense as
objects of touch. Yet, if this is really so, it clearly follows that each of the other senses is a mode
of touch; but one can see at a glance that this is impossible”; b 11-12: “On the other hand, they
reduce the special to common sensibles, as Democritus does with white and black; for he asserts
that the latter is rough, and the former smooth, while the reduces savors to the atomic figures.”
(transl. J. I. Beare)
∆ηµόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ piλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, ὅσοι λέγουσι piερὶ αἰσθήσεως, ἀτοpiώτατόν τι
piοιοῦσιν piάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁpiτὰ piοιοῦσιν. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστη ἁφή τίς ἐστιν τοῦτο δ’ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεpiὸν συνιδεῖν; b 11-12: τὸ
γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ µέλαν τὸ µὲν τραχύ φησιν εἶναι τὸ δὲ λεῖον. εἰς δὲ τὰ σχήµατα ἀνάγει τοὺς
χυµούς.
71See Theophrastus of Ephesus, Pamela Huby, Dimitri Gutas (eds.), Sources for His Life, Writings,
Thought and Influence: Commentary, vol. 4: Psychology (Texts 265-327) (Philosophia Antiqua 81),
Leiden (1999), 32-82 (fragments on sensation).
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to another school context where aspects of the example can be made fruitful.
In such a case the aspects that are used need not be the same as in the former
context.
What is striking, however, is that we have a twofold evidence in regard to
this school example, namely a critique of Democritus performed by Aristotle
himself and a rather lengthy discussion by Theophrastus in his own treatise
about senses and sense perception. In both texts the identification of ‘white’ and
‘smooth’ is quoted as a genuinely Democritean doctrine and an example for the
reduction of everything to the sense of touch and touchable qualities of atoms
and atom collsions. If Aristotle in Ζ 4 uses this example (in a different way) and
thereby refers to the physiological and psychological context, we must act on the
hypothesis that the intended audience of Ζ 4 is acquainted with this discussion
and critique.
Considering that in our argumentative context the Analytics, the Physics and
basic aspects of the Metaphysics are already presupposed, further reference to a
rather specialist-field of study brings us even closer to the inside of the school
institution of the Lykeion and into the discussions between Aristotle and his
master student Theophrastus, who by then was himself long since himself a
teacher and renowned scholar. It is true that one does not need to be familiar with
Democritean doctrines in order to understand that ‘white’ cannot be identified as
a definiens of ‘what-it-is-to-be-a-surface’, but it is also true that it is implausible
to assume that Aristotle would have argued with these examples and in such
an elliptic way if he had not intended to address an audience that had studied
physiology and psychology either with him or Theophrastus.
It is the audience’s previously acquired knowledge about the Presocratic ato-
mists that fills the gaps in the elliptic arguments. If Aristotle wanted his arguments
to be understood he had to communicate with exactly such an audience, be that
orally or by producing a written text that was fit to circulate among students and
fellow researchers, as will also be affirmed by the following arguments.
4.3 Can there be a ‘what-it-is-to-be-something’ and definitions of
composites?
Starting from 1029b22 the question is extended to composite objects in any of the
categories (from the Categories): is there a ‘what-it-is-to-be’ (ti ên einai) of compo-
site objects such as ‘white man’ at all? The identity of ‘what-it-is-to-be-a-surface’
and ‘what-it-is-to-be-a-white-surface’ was not rejected due to the special kind of
primacy of ‘white’ in relation to ‘surface’, although this relation seemed at first
sight most likely to provide parts of a substantial definition, i.e. a definition of the
ti ên einai of something.
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The discussion moves on to a more open and far-reaching question insofar as
not the identity of composite and simple objects is concerned but the possibility
to define composite objects in general. This is a rather associative move and
Aristotle starts with very preliminary considerations: can’t there be a way in
which composite objects can also be defined? If we postulate that the essential
quality of a ‘what-it-is-to-be’ is that it can be said of something ‘in respect of itself’
(kath’auto), the reverse argument would be that everything that does not meet
the contrary definition of ‘not in respect of itself’ is – at least – not obviously not
definable.
It is therefore only one first and preparatory step with which Aristotle moves
forward by this argument, and it is very elliptic in its implementation, for Ari-
stotle introduces a (possible or actual) objection with only a brief summarizing
expression. Against the assumption that only what is said ‘in respect of itself’
(kath’auto) in the primary ontologically founded sense can be predicated, he puts
forward the distinction between two different ways in which something can be
said to be ‘not in respect of itself’ (ou kath’ auto). If composites like ‘white man’
are in neither sense ‘not by themselves’ (kath’auto) one needs to inquire further
about the possibility to define them.
Ross assumes that Aristotle anticipated the objection and therefore addressed
the question.72 What is the reason for this assumption? Obviously the fact that
there is no inner necessity in the preceding argument that forces this follow-up to
be made. However, we need to positively describe this as a philosophical practice
that is charateristic of the school argumentations that are performed and reflected
in book Ζ of the Metaphysics. Elliptic expressions need to be complemented by
an audience or readership capable of doing so. This can be accomplished on the
basis of general known premisses and implications. But, it can also be used as a
didactic method that involves Aristotle’s audiences and readers in the process
of elaborating the problem, which deals with the possibility to define and to
properly have a knowledge of composite beings. Therefore, in our case knowledge
is required from the audiences, and this knowledge is a specialist resp. school
knowledge that is based on school or curricular practices.
Here it becomes obvious how, from the very beginning, the logical approach
involves ontological questions. Aristotle makes that point clear by introducing the
expression ‘robe’ (himation) as a substitute for ‘white man’. He will not be dealing
with the linguistically motivated difficulty of defining terms that consists of two
words,73 but with the problem whether ‘white man’ and other composites are one
thing that can be grasped at all.
72Ross 1924, II, 169 ad 1029b27: “The objection assumes, arbitrarily enough, that only what
is internally kath’auto can be a kath’ auto predicate of something else. But Aristotle takes it
seriously...”
73Frede/Patzig, 1988, II, 62.
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To answer that question he introduces a very formal criterion for the non-
definability of something or, in other words, for the fact that something is not
said in respect of itself (ou kath’auto): either because something different is
part of the definition, like ‘white man’ for the definition of ‘white’; or because
something that is an essential part of the definiendum is missing, as in the de-
finition of ‘himation’, i.e. ‘white man’, only ‘white’ is included in the definition
(1029b30-1030a2).74
This distinction can only be useful as a general preliminary condition whose
existence can be tested in each particular case. Therefore, only the next question
and answer lead to the real problem: composites like ‘the robe’ have not the same
being as single entities (tode ti), which are self-subsistent, because they do not
presuppose the existence of something else that is different from their own being.
In the proper sense of the word, there can only be a definition of this kind of
‘this-thing-only’ entities, whereas of other things there can be a ‘formula’ (logos),
i.e. the verbal or rational explication of its being, only in a way that is secondary
to a real definition.
4.4 Defining in Metaphysics Ζ, the Posterior Analytics, and the
Topic
The distinction between mere logos and proper definition (horismos) is further
elaborated by the reference to the Iliad75 as an example of a logos, which is not a
definition. The passage is again dense and short. However, Aristotle explains the
example and the difference between logos and definition in another text passage
in his Analytics, namely in the Posterior Analytics II, 7 (92b26-34), a text passage
that starts with the question of whether in a definition the very being (ousia) or
the what-it-is (to ti estin) is explained (Apo. 92a34-35). Therefore, what is at stake
is the question of whether the definition is an explanation of words or of the
essential being of things.
For a deeper understanding of this difference in our passage (Apo. 92b26-34)
Aristotle asks whether one would completely relieve the definition from the re-
quirement to uncover the essential being of that what is defined (Apo. 92b27).
The result would be that the definition becomes a logos, i.e. a sequence of mea-
ningful words that has the same meaning as the name of the thing that is to be
defined.
But to equate word and explanation and to dismiss the reference to the
essential nature of the definiendum would be absurd and lead to contradictions.
74To read this second alternative, we have to alter the text following Dorothea Frede by adding a
negation particle in 1029b33: Frede/Patzig, 1988, II, 63.
75See below for the example of the Iliad in different Aristotelian treatises (p. 4.6) and ff.
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This is Aristotle’s answer to the question (Apo. 92b28) as to whether the definition
can be located totally on the level of logic and semantics.
There are two arguments against this option, and it is the second that explains
the function of the Iliad example also in Metaphysics Ζ 4: (1) there would also be
definitions of non-beings; for there are words that indicate non-beings, like the
word ‘buck-deer’ or ‘dragon’, which mean something that does not exist and have
no essential being; and (2) all word sequences would be definitions. This is exactly
our challenge in Ζ 4. Here, in the Posterior Analytics, he explains this perplexity by
saying that it is possible to invent a name for every meaningful speech or sequence
of words; therefore, everytime we talk with each other we utter definitions; and
even the Iliad would be a definition.
In his commentary John Philoponus (in APo. 363,4-14) adds the explanation
that there is a name that signifies the poetry sung by Homer about the events at
the shore of Troy. If every name that signifies something were a definition then
the Iliad, that is all 24 books with around 15000 verses, would be a definition.
Philoponus also stresses one point that is implicitly present in both passages
in Metaphysics Ζ 4 and Posterior Analytics II, 7: i.e. that it is the essence of a
definition to explain the nature of the definiendum as something that is external to
mere semantics.76 Therefore, to define something is not primarily a hermeneutic
practice.
Book II of the Posterior Analytics is concerned with discussing practices of
knowledge acquisition by definitions.77 In order to do so Aristotle takes several
approaches toward the topic and analyzes the relation between syllogistic and
definitory techniques. The notion of definition (horismos), and its task to prepare
and constitute the knowledge of something and answer the what-it-is-question (ti
esti), are therefore rather strict in the Posterior Analytics. He constantly orbits the
acquisition of knowledge in the truest sense by sticking to the insight that there
can be knowledge in the primary sense of the word only about substances.78
The question that Aristotle explicitly asks in Posterior Analytics II, 7 which
leads to further questions there concerning the relationship between hermeneutic
and semantic and ontological perspectives, is also present in our context in Ζ 4.79
76in APo. 362,22-24.
77David Bronstein: Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning. The Posterior Analytics, 2016, who takes
Meno’s paradox as structural impulse for the Posterior Analytics as a whole; cf. also D. Charles,
Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, esp. 23-56: M. T. Ferejohn,
Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2013, 3-27; Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration in:
Articles on Aristotle: 1. Science, ed. by J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji, London: Duckworth
1975, 65-87.
78E.g. APo 90b30-31; 93a3-6; 93b29; 96a20-23.
79Ps.-Alexander starts his commentary on book Ζ with the summary that the book is about
definitions: Alex.Aphr. in Metaph. 459,4-5.
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Aristotle constantly reminds his audience or readers of the primary candidate
for being in the primary sense, i.e. the single entity or first substance (of the
Categories) (tode ti) (1030a3-5) and confirms the theory that only these entities are
definable in the truest sense of the word, because they are not said of something
else, because they do not need something else in order to be defined or to have
their proper being (1030a10-11).
The reference to the Categories is acknowledged by Frede/Patzig (II, 66) in their
interpretation of 1030a12, where Aristotle concludes that there is no ‘what-it-is-to-
be’ in the proper sense for anything else but the first substances. The expression
he uses for this distinction is “what is not as a species of a genus”. Since in the
Categories Aristotle distinguishes between species and genus only in regard to
substances, it is clear that this expression underlines the special position of the
(first) substance also in the Metaphysics.80
The rather strict perspective of the theory of definition in the Posterior Analy-
tics is an important foil for the audiences of the Metaphysics because Aristotle here
tends to also allow secondary and less strict meanings of being and definition,
not as a critical revision of the perspective of the Analytics but complemen-
tary to their approach under the different scope of the newly-introduced first
philosophy.
This becomes even clearer in one of the next argumentational moves
(1030a14-17) by which Aristotle – for the time being (but cf. 1030b4-6) – ter-
minates his strict only-being-can-be-defined -position, which is succeeded by the
position that refers to the insight that everything is said in many ways. Whereas
the ‘what-it-is-to-be’ only belongs to substances and therefore, there can only
be a definition (horismos) of substances, there can be a logos, i.e. a sequence of
words that renders the meaning of every verbal expression, of everything else.
This is completely in agreement with the distinction between horismos and logos
in the Posterior Analytics. The simplest account that could be given would be to
explain a word (onoma) by saying that this belongs to that (ὅτι τόδε τῷδε ὑpiάρχει
(1030a15-16)), a typical expression for accidental predication as we find it in
Metaphysics book ∆ 7.81 Alternatively, there can be a more precise explanation
instead of the simple account.82 In both cases, the result will not be a definition in
the proper sense of the word.
Again, there is no need to postulate the chronological priority of the “philo-
sophical lexicon” (book ∆) as we have it, but what we can presuppose is that in
discussion circles where questions of predication and substantial qualities were
taught, the need would have arisen for terminological and conceptual clarification,
80Cf. Ross, I, ad A 9, 991a31 with additional parallel passages in Aristotle.
81Metaph. ∆ 7, 1017a7-19.
82I do not see why it is necessary to assume that the more precise explanation needs to refer to
a complex expression as Frede/Patzig suggest: 67
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which can be satisfied by exemplary conceptual distinctions. It is plausible to
assume that such a collection was in itself in a constant state of flux with high
inner dynamics. It was subject to continuous revisions, additions and erasures.
This can be substantiated by the observation that Aristotle frequently refers to
the need to distinguish between multiple meanings of words and notions as it is
reflected in book∆ of the Metaphysics.
Aristotle famously starts the examination with this in book Ζ and presents it
as a tool for further approaches to the being as being.83 In Ζ 4, the next section of
arguments is introduced by a question that – by distinguishing between multiple
meanings – opens up new options on how to deal with the problem of defining or
explaining things that are not substances but dependent properties or complex
units (1030a17). Aristotle introduces this question with the particle ‘ἢ’, which
generally can be used as the introductory particle for simple questions.84 In the
Metaphysics it is often used at the beginning of a new argumentational section,
as in our context: in order to look at the question from another perspective.85
Although a new argumentational line is started thereafter, it somehow continues
with what has just been introduced. For in some way the distinction between logos
and horismos also leads to the differentiation of multiple, gradually different
meanings that are primary or secondary in regard to the specific nature of the
definiendum.
A connection between the two passages is built by the reference to the basic
distinction of the Categories between substance and the other categories, which is
also applied in the Topic (I,9) – a passage to which Ps.-Alexander refers in order
to explain why and how Aristotle widens the horizon to the description of the
being of something other than individual beings.86 Here and elsewhere (cf. e.g.
1030b11-12) Aristotle gives a short list of the ten categories, which include –
beside substance – quality and quantity. This way of speaking is efficient and,
for Aristotle, part of his school conventions, which also include school examples,
speech patterns derived from teaching conventions and school practices, as well
as often discussed and presented notions and distinctions.
Aristotle confronts or rather conjoins the two different perspectives of the
Categories and the Metaphysics by saying:
“But after all, ‘definition’, like ‘what a thing is’, has several meanings; ‘what a thing is’
in one sense means substance and a ‘this’, in another one or other of the predicates,
quantity, quality, and the like. For as ‘is’ is predicable of all things, not however in
83Metaph. Ζ 1, 1028a10.
84Cf. LSJ s.v. ἢ; J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles. Second Edition, Oxford, 1954, 73.
85Lucas Angioni, Definition and Essence in Metaphysics Vii 4, in: Ancient Philosophy 34 (1), 2014,
75-100 underlines the complementarity of sections 1030a2-17 and 1030a17-32.
86Alex.Aphr. in Metaph. 473,4-10 quotes Top. I,9,103b29ff.
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the same sense, but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary way,
so too the ‘what’ belongs simply to substance, but in a limited sense to the other
categories. For even of a quality we might ask what it is, so that a quality also is a
‘what’ — not simply, however, but just as, in the case of that which is not, some
say, in the abstract, that that which is not is — not is simply, but is non-existent. So
too with a quality.” (1030a21-26)87
It is the perspective of theMetaphysics that speaks of primary and secondary sense
and proper sense and derivative sense as we already find it in the introductory
statement in Ζ 1.88 There, Aristotle – in the text as it has been transmitted – refers
the recipient back to what has been said “earlier” (proteron).89 Usually, Aristotle
by using the word “proteron” refers back to what has been said before in the same
treatise or discipline. Jaeger in his edition therefore athetizes the reference alto-
gether, since he holds the opinion that books Ζ and Η were originally composed
separately, and book∆ was a later addition to the Metaphysics. Frede/Patzig more
cautiously suggest athetizing only “proteron” while keeping the rest of the text
in 1028a10-11, since Aristotle could have referred to an originally independent
treatise.90 This reasonable position can be supported and further developed by the
perspective of audience action and by contextualizing Aristotle’s argumentative
practices. Then we do not need to fix a certain static text to which Aristotle refers,
but rather describe a discursive practice that was developed and modified in the
Academy and Lykeion as a tool for different ontological and predicational studies,
and which was written down at different stages of the development of parts of the
project of a first philosophy.
Therefore, we have an intensive intercommunication and reciprocity between
the perspective of the Posterior Analytics and their path to knowledge acquisition
and knowledge transfer and Metaphysics Ζ 4, which further develops the idea of a
hierarchy of meanings, all of which share the very being of the object of knowledge
as the common center of reference (1030a28-b3).
On the opposite side we find practices of definitions in Topic VI:91 It goes
beyond the limits of this paper to decipher the entanglements between the dis-
cipline discussed in the Posterior Analytics or in the Metaphysics and that of the
87ὥσpiερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑpiάρχει piᾶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁµοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ µὲν piρώτως τοῖς δ’ ἑpiοµένως,
οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁpiλῶς µὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ piὼς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ γὰρ τὸ piοιὸν ἐροίµεθ’ ἂν τί ἐστιν,
ὥστε καὶ τὸ piοιὸν τῶν τί ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁpiλῶς, ἀλλ’ ὥσpiερ ἐpiὶ τοῦ µὴ ὄντος λογικῶς φασί (25)
τινες εἶναι τὸ µὴ ὄν, οὐχ ἁpiλῶς ἀλλὰ µὴ ὄν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ piοιόν.
88Ps.-Alexander explicitly explains this correlation to the scope of the book with the distinction
of multiple senses: Alex.Aphr.in Metaph. 459,4-17.
89Metaph. 1028a10-11: There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be, as we pointed
out previously in our book on the various senses of words; Τὸ ὂν λέγεται piολλαχῶς, καθάpiερ
διειλόµεθα piρότερον ἐν τοῖς piερὶ τοῦ piοσαχῶς
90Frede/Patzig, II, 10.
91Lucas Angioni, Defining Topics in Aristotle’s Topics VI, in: Philosophos 19, 2, 2014, p. 151-93.
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Topic in general. However, notwithstanding the fact that the Topic as we have it is
earlier than the Analytics as we have it,92 it is fruitful to hint at a comparison of the
scope and the argumentational moves in Topic and Analytics (and Metaphysics)93
in terms of audience address.
In Topic VI the task is to give criteria by which one can analyze the definition
and quality of a definition of the opponent and improve one’s own definitions.94
Therefore, the considerations do not lead to a more precise understanding of
the particular object of the definition or to an answer to the question of which
objects can be defined in the primary sense of the word, but to a more useful
analysis of the quality and the mistakes of the opponent’s definition as a guidance
for one’s own defining practices.95 Aristotle uses the same model of genus and
differentia specifica as in the Analytics, but handles it differently. The distinctions
do not aim for a ‘real’ definition that is able to ontologically uncover the very
being of the object, but hint at the need to avoid possible flaws in the defining
process, namely, either to be indistinct/obscure or to include in the definition
parts that are not necessary96; the first possibility to be indistinct is if there
is a homonymous expression in the definition,97 another if a metaphor or a
neologism98 is used.
In this approach, the analysis of flaws and good definitions leads to the pivotal
question of whether the definition consists of ‘per se/in respect of itself’ or of ‘for
us’ better known notions.
“The demolition of a definition will most surely win a general approval if the definer
happens to have framed his account neither from what is without qualification
more intelligible nor yet from what is so to us.” (Top. VI,4,142a13-16, transl. W. A.
Pickard) 99
In these cases ontological questions and tasks are involved and implicitly function
as criteria for the evaluation of the definition.
“This sort of error is always found where what the object is does not stand first in
the account, e.g. the definition of body as that which has three dimensions, or the
92Christof Rapp, Topos und Syllogismus bei Aristoteles, in: G. Ueding/Th. Schirren (edd.), Topik
und Rhetorik, Tübingen 2000, 15-35, esp. 20-21 emphasizes the consensus between Topic and
Analytics in general and concerning the syllogismos.
93Lucas Angioni, Defining Topics in Aristotle’s Topics VI, in: Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia
19 (2), 2014, 151-193.
94Cf. Alex.Aphr. in Top. 420,7-14.
95Top. VII,4, 142a12-16.
96Top. VII,1, 139b12-18.
97Top. VI,2,139b19-20.
98With reference to Plato’s use of unknown words: Top. VI,2, 140a3-5.
99µάλιστα δ’ ὁµολογουµένως ἀναιρεῖν ἐνδέχεται τὸν ὁρισµόν, ἐὰν µήτ’ ἐκ τῶν ἁpiλῶς γνωριµω-
τέρων µήτ’ ἐκ τῶν ἡµῖν τυγχάνῃ τὸν λόγον piεpiοιηµένος.
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definition of man, supposing anyone to give it, as that which knows how to count;
for it is not stated what it is that has three dimensions, or what it is that knows
how to count; whereas the genus is meant to indicate what it is, and is submitted
first of the terms in the definition.” (Top. VI,5,142b23-29, transl. Pickard) 100
This ontological backbone of the topical practices is enclosed in the progression
of the presentation but does not eliminate or withdraw the dialectical context
in which the disputational victory is at stake. It is therefore, not the business of
the dialectician, schooled in the Topic, to discover the ontological structure of
the definiens or definientia in general. But, he uses the ontological principles and
relations in order to find the most convincing, most unchallengeable definition
and argument as part of defining practices that allow us to explore more than the
primary sense of a definition and definable object. On the contrary, the topical
practices require a wider horizon of definitions according to common disputational
practices and objects of the everyday realm of experiences, and therefore only
hint at a hierarchy of primary and secondary senses.
4.5 In Dialogue with Academic Discussions: Metaph. 1030a25-27
and the Sophistes
The widening of perspective in Ζ 4 towards several meanings and different ways
of being besides the primary being, which are the first substances, however
goes beyond the intercommunication between different pragmateiai or rather:
different disciplines of Aristotle’s school practices, and also include Platonic or
Academic discourses and even Presocratic and especially Eleatic discussions. The
discussion about the being of what is not, is closely entangled with Plato’s dialogue
Sophistes101 and other texts.
“For even of a quality we might ask what it is, so that a quality also is a ‘what’ —
not simply, however, but just as, in the case of that which is not, some say, in the
abstract, that that which is not is — not is simply, but is non-existent.” (Metaph.
1030a25-27, transl. Ross)102
Aristotle uses the third person plural (“they say” (φασί)), and thereby introduces
other protagonists to whom he can refer affirmatively. There is more than one
100ἐν ἅpiασι δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁµάρτηµα ἔστιν ἐν οἷς οὐ piρόκειται τοῦ λόγου τὸ τί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τοῦ
σώµατος ὁρισµὸς “τὸ ἔχον τρεῖς διαστάσεις”, ἢ εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωpiον ὁρίσαιτο τὸ (25) ἐpiιστάµενον
ἀριθµεῖν. οὐ γὰρ εἴρηται τί ὂν τρεῖς ἔχει δια- στάσεις, ἢ τί ὂν ἐpiίσταται ἀριθµεῖν τὸ δὲ γένος
βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σηµαίνειν, καὶ piρῶτον ὑpiοτίθεται τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισµῷ λεγοµένων.
101I thank Sandra Erker for fruitful discussions on the whole topic of audience-driven dynamics
and school practices in Aristotle and especially on the entanglements with Plato’s Sophistes.
102ἀλλ’ ὥσpiερ ἐpiὶ τοῦ µὴ ὄντος λογικῶς φασί τινες εἶναι τὸ µὴ ὄν, οὐχ ἁpiλῶς ἀλλὰ µὴ ὄν, οὕτω
καὶ τὸ piοιόν.
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passage in the Platonic dialogue that could be identified as the target of the
reference, although it is even more probable that Aristotle in a more general
way refers to discussion practices about the non-being that somehow is/has
being:
However, among the published dialogues, we find this in the Sophistes103, in
the Politeia (e.g. R. 478b-e), and in the first part of the Parmenides. In the Sophistes
the sequence of arguments is somehow similar to what Aristotle is doing here.
There, the Friend (xenos means here ‘Gastfreund’) from Elea starts by reminding
his dialogue partner Theaetetus of the teaching of the philosopher Parmenides,
who “from the beginning and until the end [..] in prose and in metre everytime said”
and taught that it is impossible to connect being and non-being (Sph. 237a4-7
and ff.).
Thereby, the father figure Parmenides obtains a similar role and function
to that of the later Socrates in Plato’s dialogues; for he teaches his students
by constantly reminding and re-thinking his methodological principle, just like
Socrates again and again talks about the forms and the need to assume forms
in order to achieve sufficient knowledge about singular entities.104 The Friend
from Elea teaches Theaetetus to go beyond the Eleatic approach to being without
resolving it. The task is to think of being in a way that is a secondary way of
defining being (in regard to the priority of unity in comparison to multitude) but a
way that is necessary and as a “second sailing” (cf. Phd. 99d1) suitable in order to
acquire knowledge of the world on one’s own.
First, the Friend presupposes that that what is not can be in no way connec-
ted with being. This assumption leads to the consequence that it proves to be
impossible to connect anything whatsoever with non-being, since every property
is connected in some way with being. The Friend shows this by the connection
of ‘one’ and ‘many’ with non-being. This argumentation is closely entangled with
the dialectical studies in the Parmenides, where Parmenides together with the
young Aristotle – a different person than the Philosopher Aristotle,105 but perhaps
introduced as Plato’s subtle hint to his master student – analyzes the conceptual
relation between one and being and together with being with a multitude of other
concepts. There, in the Parmenides, it is shown that, if one disentangles ‘one’ from
‘being’ (‘if one one’ (in contrast to ‘if one is’)) then it is disentangled from every-
thing else and cannot ‘be’ something anymore and therefore cannot be predicated
or said or thought of (Prm. 142c-e). On the contrary, if we admit the being of the
one, then everything can be said of the one, for being implies oneness, many-ness,
103Frede/Patzig, I, 68 refer to Sph. 257c-258e and 258b8-c3; Ross, II, 171 to Sph. 237, 256ff.
104Phd. 100a9-b2 (and 75c-76d etc.); Euthyphr. 6d9-e10; Men.73e-77b: Crat. 438a-440a (esp.
439c6-d2).
105Nails, Debra, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics, Indianapolis,
2002, 89.
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identity, diversity, wholeness, being part of something, motion, rest, etc. (Prm.
143a4-6).
In the Sophistes the Friend reveals this necessary connection of being with
everything else that can be said or thought of and – seemingly – ends in a perplexity
and calls for Theaetetus to find another path:
“Friend: Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavor with all your might
to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing into it either existence
or unity or plurality.
Theaet.: It would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task when I
see you thus discomfited.” (Sph. 239b8-c3, transl. by Benjamin Jowett)106
The Friend asks Theaetetus to try again because he is young and like young people
with full energy. He should, thus, try another path to true knowledge. This seems
to be a hint in terms of philosophical history that Theaetetus, as a representative
of a new generation, should take up the aporiai in which people who were direct
followers of Parmenides have fallen. In the Sophistes, this emancipation – as it
were – does not work by recanting Eleatic wisdom but by trying another path
that is different (but not totally independent) from the dialectics of one and
being.
Together with the Friend, who of course does not abandon his young student,
Theaetetus comes to the insight that the reflection on the being of images with
some necessity leads to the opinion that non-being in some way needs to be
connected to being (Sph. 240c1-2). For in some way images are what they represent,
in some way they are not, but something different from that. It is the task of the
following discussion to follow this lead. The argumentational moves, therefore,
direct the disputants and the readers to insights that one cannot have only one
primary sense of being, but that it is necessary to distinguish further, secondary
and derivative senses. Since only forms are the very being of something whereas
everything else, i.e. a singular thing, has this being only as a property of something
else (ep. 7, 343a-c and Ti. 49c7-50b5), singular sensible objects are in some sense
images of the form, i.e. something that has properties and similarities of the being
but has a (different) substratum and is thereby different from the very being of
the form.
In this sense the new way of the new generation, inspired by the Friend from
Elea and elaborated by the young Theaetetus, approaches the general problem of
singular beings directly and suggests secondary meanings of ‘being’ and secondary
106ΞΕ. ῎Ιθι ἡµῖν εὖ καὶ γενναίως, ἅτε νέος ὤν, ὅτι µάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας piειράθητι, µήτε
οὐσίαν µήτε τὸ ἓν µήτε piλῆθος ἀριθµοῦ piροστιθεὶς τῷ µὴ ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν φθέγξασθαί τι piερὶ
αὐτοῦ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πολλὴ µεντἄν µε καὶ ἄτοpiος ἔχοι piροθυµία τῆς ἐpiιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαῦθ’ ὁρῶν piάσχοντα
αὐτὸς ἐpiιχειροίην.
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ways in which something can be said to be (something). Theaetetus’ request is
fulfilled by Socrates in the Phaedo, i.e. in a text that is designed by Plato as the
philosophical legacy of his teacher and which at the same time presents his own
concept and practice as an experienced teacher. Here, the answer to the question
of how one can recognize and define something that is a singular sensible object is
the theory of forms, which function as sufficient causes (aitiai) for the ontologically
and predicationally-dependent sensible entities.
Starting from this entanglement with the Phaedo – which was without any
doubt a pivotal text in the Platonic Academy and of which members of the
Academy are very likely to have been aware – there is another connection and
reference from Metaphysics Ζ, namely argumentations in Ζ 17, where Aristotle
takes another argumentational approach to the being qua being107 and asks in
which way the substance can be considered as principle and cause (aitia). This
takes up the arguments about the primacy of the substance and the relatedness of
predications in other categories to the substance as their formal (and) final cause
in Ζ 4 and 5, and especially in the following passage in Ζ 4.
Although this perspective is implicitly or explicitly present in book Ζ as a
whole,108 the background of an audience that is acquainted with Platonic loci
classici seems to add substantially to the explanation of Aristotle’s argumenta-
tional moves. E.g. it helps to clarify why Aristotle in Ζ 17, 1041a7-9 alludes to
non-sensible substances in the first place. For it is not in itself convincing to refer
to Ζ 3 or Ζ 11109, where no non-sensible substances are mentioned explicitly. Ζ
16 in fact discusses the issue of the separation or separateness of forms (eidos),
but as a distinguishing dispute with the Platonists. The consideration of eternal,
non-sensible substances is, thus, introduced or at least inspired by Platonists.110
Aristotle here even – cautiously – agrees that it might be (even) necessary to admit
that there are eternal substances (1041a3). The primary scope of this reference
therefore does not seem to be the rivalry between the two schools as monolithic
social entities, but rather a dispute that was ongoing across the two institutions
and between members of both.
But, if we take Platonic texts into account then it is plausible to assume that
the mentioning of Platonic discussions (as represented in the dialogues) on the
foundational role of the forms as aitiai (esp. Phd. 99a5-b6 and 99d1) may have
inspired not only the reflections on non-sensible forms (in Ζ 16 and at the start of
Ζ 17) but also the connection between the argumentational approach in Ζ 17 and
Ζ 4-6. This means: a connection that is built between the current task to consider
107“What and what kind of thing one needs to say that the substance is, we want to say by making
quasi another start.” Ζ 17, 1041a6-7.
108Cf. the observations in Peramatzis 2017.
109Ζ 3, 1029b3-12, Ζ 11, 1037a10-17: Frede/Patzig, II, 309.
110Metaph. Ζ 16, 1040b27-1041a3.
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the substances as causes on the one hand (Ζ 17), and the question in relation to
what singular beings can be defined and recognized on the other, reflected in Ζ 4,
as we have seen, in terms of predicational relations.
Unlike in Α 9, Aristotle does not include himself in the group of friends of the
forms but carefully (“perhaps” (ἴσως) 1041a3) distances himself from the theory of
forms while, however, approving the existence of eternal beings. Those who take
the forms as separate beings are in some respect, he argues, doing right where
others are not (1040b28-29), by emphasizing the perspective of the primacy for us,
i.e. for our way of acquiring knowledge (1040b33).
The argumentation in the Sophistes (239 and ff.) thus also offers a direct
connection to Aristotle’s task in Metaphysics Ζ and especially in Ζ 4, where the
fundament is prepared for the distinction between being in primary and derivative
senses that can be traced and referred back to the primary being: i.e. in the
structure of ‘in relation to one and derived from one’ (pros hen kai aph’ henos).111
This, however, is closely related to the consideration of (first) substances as
causes.
With regard to the affirmative reference to Platonic and/or Eleatic discussions
on non-being, the intended audience of Ζ 4 is likely to be acquainted with and in
favor of Academic discourses. Aristotle presents his critique rather cautiously.
He involves the background of the Sophistes and Phaedo in and for his argument.
Compared with the harsh reference to Platonic theory in Posterior Analytics I 22,
the dialogue with Academic approaches here is more affirmative and with less
striving for distinction. These are not radical, but only gradual differences. They
can be led back to the different argumentational context, but also to different
input and response from the side of the audiences.
4.6 Secondary options for definitions
In the next argument Aristotle reminds the reader that it is not only necessary
to clarify how we should speak of something but also how it behaves (piῶς ἔχει:
1030a27). Are we, then, moving from a logical discourse to an ontological one?
However, what follows does not define ‘what-it-is-to-be-something’.112 It does
not refrain from talking about ways of speaking and predicating. Rather, the
preceding arguments are different insofar as Aristotle draws the conclusion from
the preliminary considerations that one must define more concretely the way in
which something can be said to be and can be defined in a secondary way, which
needs to be correlated to the primary being of the first substances.
111Metaph. Ζ 4, 1030b3, locus classicus in Metaph. Γ 1, 1003a33-b1, Γ 2, 1003b1-4; but cf. also EE
1236b26, EN 1096b27-28. On the pros hen -relation cf. also Aubenque, 1962, 191-192.
112Frede/Patzig, II, 68 against Ross, II, 171
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This is compatible to how Aristotle in other texts defines or explains logikôs:113
In de generatione animalium (Β 8, 747b28-30) with ‘logikôs’ he refers to a more
general approach that is not bound to the nearest principles. This implies a certain
sense of being abstract and less concrete, which in Physics I 1 is connected to the
first beginning of the process of acquiring knowledge.114
Here, in Ζ 4, the argumentation since 1030a17 heads towards an amplification
of the consistent, but therefore narrower perspective115, which only allows defini-
tion and being in the primary sense, by considering derivative kinds of definitions
and predications and derivative kinds of being something and being a unity. It
is not the difference between ontological and logical that marks the boundary
between the different approaches but the epistemic rigor and request for pure
being and oneness in comparison with the requirement of instruments that allow
us to understand and describe the being of compound entities.
It is also at this level of thought and methodological principles where there
are close entanglements between Metaphysics Ζ and the Theaetetus and Sophistes
of Plato – references that are supported by the use of similar examples in pivotal
argumentational contexts (e.g. the example ‘white’).116
To be sure, the following text passage (1030a32-1030b13) is in multiple ways
connected to passages in Metaphysics Ζ and Η and other pragmateiai117, therefore
the background in Platonic dialogues remains rather remote. However, it could
have been used as a tool for Aristotle to go beyond the scope of the Categories and
the definitory method in the Analytics, when Aristotle declares here in Ζ 4 that it is
not possible to understand the secondary kinds of being and definition as cases of
homonymy. Homonymy, as defined at the beginning of the Categories (Cat. 1a1-6.),
simply cannot imply and sufficiently express the conceptual relation between the
secondary and the primary beings. Instead he prefers the other alternative that is
mentioned: namely that the secondary way of being is explained “by adding or
removing something” (1030a33-34).118
113See above p. 9-10; Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, 2nd edition, Oxford, 1993,
173
114Ph. I 1, 184a16-b5.
115Frank A. Lewis, A Nose by Any Other Name: Sameness, Substitution, and Essence in Metaphysics
Z 5, in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28, 2005, 161-91 S. 161 argues that Z 4 presents an
exclusive view of definition.
116E.g. Tht. 156c6-157d2.
117Frede/Patzig, 1988, II, 71 with reference to Metaphysics Γ 1 and 2 and to G.E.L. Owen, Logic
and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle, in: I. Düring and G.E.L. Owen (edd.), Aristotle
and Plato in the Mid-Fourth-Century, Göteborg 1960, 163-190.
118When Aristotle concludes that it does not matter whether one call the relationship and
dependence by one of these expressions (1030b3-4) he refers to the phrase ‘according to one’
(kath’en (1030b3)), which is distinguished from the ‘in reference to’ (pros hen) phrase which he
prefers. (Frede/Patzig, 1988, II, 71-72) He aims at emphasizing that the concrete understanding of
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Ps.-Alexander explains right at the beginning of his interpretation of the new
approach, which starts in Metaph. 1030a14 (or 1030a17) that the being of other
objects can be explained by an addition119, i.e. the addition of what the being
‘such and such’ (poion or poson etc.) is (or: the ‘what-it-is-to-be-such-and-such’).
From this general account he – cautiously (474,15) – presents an interpretation of
the puzzling expression “by addition or subtraction” and refers the subtraction
to the definition of substances (without any addition). Frede/Patzig convincingly
argue that this is a rather weak interpretation because addition and subtraction
are taken as referring to different levels of argument, and suggest that subtraction
should be taken as meaning ‘negation’ as in ‘not recognizable’ in relation to
‘recognizable’.120 This does not seem to be plausible either if one considers the
preceding reference to the discussion on the status of the non-being (1030a25-26)
and a parallel text in Metaphysics Γ:
Here, in Γ 1 of the Metaphysics, a similar case is made by implicitly referring
to the Categories and the being of that which is said in categories other than the
substance (ousia). This being is led back to the primary being in different ways
according to the different categories. In this context the being of ‘what is not’ is
also mentioned explicitly as one case among others, where ‘being’ is used in a
secondary but not only homonymous or analogous way.121
“There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they are related to
one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous. Everything
which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health,
another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of
health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to
the medical art, one thing in the sense that it possesses it, another in the sense that
it is naturally adapted to it, another in the sense that it is a function of the medical
art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many
senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things
are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of
substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions
or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance,
or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of some of these things
or of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is
non-being. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the
same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have
one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the
the relationship is not a question of the correct name.
119Alex.Aphr. in Metaph. 472,33-474,3
120Frede/Patzig, II, 70.
121Metaph. Γ 1, 1003a33-b15, see esp. 1003b10.
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case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense
have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to
study all things that are, qua being.” (Metaph. Γ 1, 1003a33-b15, transl. Ross)122
Here, the main point is that in every derivative case of being there is a particular
referential relationship to the primary being, such as affections of the substance or
as ways to the substance. As an extreme example, non-being is mentioned in order
to argue that even in this case there is a dependence on and relation to substance
in that a particular being is negated. This argument is parallel to the argument in Ζ
4, 1030a25-27. Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that ‘negation’ (apophasis)
in Γ 1123 has the same meaning as aphairesis in Ζ 4, 1030a33. ‘Not recognizable’
is in some way, although a certain being (‘recognizable’) is denied. Therefore,
one could argue that its being can be defined through subtraction (of a certain
being).
But, there is another case to make in regard to Γ 1:
“Therefore, we say that also that what is not is.” (1003b10)124
In the face of this assertion, which Aristotle makes in the first person plural in Γ
1, we must reconsider the degree of distance that might be implied in the third
person plural in Ζ 4, 1030a25 and the description that this way of speaking can
be characterized as ‘logical’.
The two texts refer to roughly the same topic, but do it differently according
to the different argumentational context and different audience activity resp.
audience expectations. In Γ 1 there is no need for Aristotle to distance himself
from the position that had been developed in the discourse presented in the
Platonic Sophistes.
In Ζ Aristotle introduces an approach to primary and secondary being that
allows him to keep to a strict notion of being without excluding (nearly) everything
from the realm of being.
Since in the Sophistes the gradual difference in the being of primary and
derivative beings is not pointed at, and therefore no hierarchical relation bet-
ween being and non-being (this something) is established,125 the argument aims
122Τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται µὲν piολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ piρὸς ἓν καὶ µίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁµωνύµως ἀλλ’
ὥσpiερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅpiαν piρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ µὲν τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ piοιεῖν τὸ δὲ τῷ σηµεῖον
εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ δ’ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν piρὸς ἰατρικήν (τὸ µὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν
ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφυὲς εἶναι piρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς),
ὁµοιοτρόpiως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόµεθα λεγόµενα τούτοις, — οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν λέγεται piολλαχῶς
µὲν ἀλλ’ ἅpiαν piρὸς µίαν ἀρχήν τὰ µὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ’ ὅτι piάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ’
ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ piοιότητες ἢ piοιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας ἢ τῶν piρὸς
τὴν οὐσίαν λεγοµένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς ἀpiοφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας διὸ καὶ τὸ µὴ ὂν εἶναι µὴ ὄν φαµεν.
123Or as mentioned directly before: ‘privation’ (steresis) 1003b8.
124διὸ καὶ τὸ µὴ ὂν εἶναι µὴ ὄν φαµεν.
125Sph. 258b9-c5
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at establishing the concept that non-being is in every single case not absolute
non-being but means ‘not-this-being’ or ‘being-different-than-X’. Aristotle can,
therefore, not simply accept the reflections in the Sophistes, but add something
significant to it.
Aristotle concludes the argumentation by referring to a previously mentioned
thesis according to which a definition is (or is not), if the name says the same as the
discursive explanation (1030a7-8 and 1030b7-8). He puts emphasis on the insight
that the unity of the object of definition is an important point of reference and a
decisive criterion. Objects are in a primary or derivative way definable depending
on the kind and degree of unity they have: 1030b8-13.
Again, the Iliad is used as an example, but as an example to illustrate the
kind of unity that is not meant. The Iliad here exemplifies a continuous unity.126
This seems to refer to the Iliad simply as a running text where one word or one
line follows after the other or as a continuous storyline where one action follows
after the other. In contrast to the unity of a substance, which is definable and
contains only what is pertinent to the thing to be defined (ἐὰν ἑνὸς ᾖ (1030b9)),
this is a rather weak kind of unity due to mere continuity, which is the minimal
requirement for a unity.
Aristotle explains what is meant by a mere continuity and the connecti-
on through a conjunction roughly at the beginning of book Ι (Metaph. Ι 1,
1052a15-1052b1)127 as part of the description of multiple senses of oneness
126Ps.-Alexander argues that the description “tied by a link” (συνδέσµῳ) should be understood as
an explanation for the assertion that the Iliad is a unity through continuity (Alex.Aphr.in Metaph.
475,29-32). This is supported by the parallel expression in Metaph. Η 6, 1045a13 and in the
Posterior Analytics Β 10, 93b35-37: λόγος δ’ εἷς ἐστὶ διχῶς, ὁ µὲν συνδέσµῳ, ὥσpiερ ἡ ᾿Ιλιάς, ὁ δὲ
τῷ ἓν καθ’ ἑνὸς δηλοῦν µὴ κατὰ συµβεβηκός.
127“We have said previously, in our distinction of the various meanings of words, that ‘one’
has several meanings; while it is used in many senses, the things that are primarily and of their
own nature and not accidentally called one may be summarized under four heads. There is the
continuous, either in general, or especially that which is continuous by nature and not by contact
nor by bonds; and of these, those things have more unity and are prior, whose movement is more
indivisible and simpler. That which is a whole and has a certain shape and form is one in a still
higher degree; and especially if a thing is of this sort by nature, and not by force like the things
which are unified by glue or nails or by being tied together, i.e. if it has in itself something which
is the cause of its continuity. A thing is of this sort because its movement is one and indivisible in
place and time; so that evidently if a thing has by nature a principle of movement that is of the first
kind (i.e. local movement) and the first in that kind (i.e. circular movement), this is in the primary
sense one extended thing. The things, then, which are in this way one are either continuous or
whole, and the other things that are one are those whose formula is one. Of this sort are the things
the thought of which is one, i.e. those the thought of which is indivisible; and it is indivisible if the
thing is indivisible in kind or in number. In number, then, the individual is indivisible, and in kind,
that which in intelligibility and in knowledge is indivisible, so that that which causes substances
to be one must be one in the primary sense. ‘One’ then, has all these meanings—the naturally
continuous, the whole, the individual, and the universal. And all these are one because in some
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and refers back to the analyses in book ∆128, where he distinguishes between
accidental unity (like the unity of ‘educated man’) and unity in respect of itself of
which continuous unity is the simplest and least conceptual. Here, in book Ι he is
much more interested in the kind of unity that has its origin in the essence of a
thing. Therefore, the mere external, as it were, unity of the continuous unity by a
conjunction is only referred to as the negative foil of the real (prôtôs or haplôs)
unity that is constituted by the very being of a thing.
“There is the continuous, either in general, or especially that which is continuous
by nature and not by contact nor by bonds; and of these, those things have more
unity and are prior, whose movement is more indivisible and simpler. That which
is a whole and has a certain shape and form is one in a still higher degree; and
especially if a thing is of this sort by nature, and not by force like the things which
are unified by glue or nails or by being tied together, i.e. if it has in itself something
which is the cause of its continuity.” (Metaph. ∆ 1. 1052a19-25, transl. Ross) 129
‘By conjunction’ here represents a kind of continuous unity that is only external
and fabricated by force and not through an inner connectedness that the object
has on its own.130 Together with the distinction from book ∆ between substanti-
al/essential and accidental unity, this fanning out of possible kinds or meanings of
unity correspond to the discussions in book Ζ and Η and the tentative approaches
to those kinds of unity that refer to the independence of an essential being of
something.
cases the movement, in others the thought or the formula, is indivisible.”
Τὸ ἓν ὅτι µὲν λέγεται piολλαχῶς, ἐν τοῖς piερὶ τοῦ piοσαχῶς διῃρηµένοις εἴρηται piρότερον piλεο-
ναχῶς δὲ λεγοµένου οἱ συγκεφαλαιούµενοι τρόpiοι εἰσὶ τέτταρες τῶν piρώτων καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ λε-
γοµένων ἓν ἀλλὰ µὴ κατὰ συµβεβηκός. τό τε γὰρ συνεχὲς ἢ ἁpiλῶς ἢ µάλιστά γε τὸ φύσει καὶ
µὴ ἁφῇ µηδὲ δεσµῷ (καὶ τούτων µᾶλλον ἓν καὶ piρότερον οὗ ἀδιαιρετωτέρα ἡ κίνησις καὶ µᾶλλον
ἁpiλῆ) ἔτι τοιοῦτον καὶ µᾶλλον τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἔχον τινὰ µορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, µάλιστα δ’ εἴ τι φύσει
τοιοῦτον καὶ µὴ βίᾳ, ὥσpiερ ὅσα κόλλῃ ἢ γόµφῳ ἢ συνδέσµῳ, ἀλλὰ ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῷ
τοῦ συνεχὲς εἶναι. τοιοῦτον δὲ τῷ µίαν τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τόpiῳ καὶ χρόνῳ, ὥστε
φανερόν, εἴ τι φύσει κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχει τῆς piρώτης τὴν piρώτην, οἷον λέγω φορᾶς κυκλοφορίαν,
ὅτι τοῦτο piρῶτον µέγεθος ἕν. τὰ µὲν δὴ οὕτως ἓν ᾗ συνεχὲς ἢ ὅλον, τὰ δὲ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος εἷς ᾖ,
τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἡ νόησις µία, τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἀδιαίρετος, ἀδιαίρετος δὲ τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου εἴδει ἢ ἀριθµῷ
ἀριθµῷ µὲν οὖν τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀδιαίρετον, εἴδει δὲ τὸ τῷ γνωστῷ καὶ τῇ ἐpiιστήµῃ, ὥσθ’ ἓν ἂν εἴη
piρῶτον τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις αἴτιον τοῦ ἑνός. λέγεται µὲν οὖν τὸ ἓν τοσαυταχῶς, τό τε συνεχὲς φύσει
καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ καθόλου, piάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἓν τῷ ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι τῶν µὲν
τὴν κίνησιν τῶν δὲ τὴν νόησιν ἢ τὸν λόγον.
128Metaph. ∆ 6, 1015b34-1016a17.
129τό τε γὰρ συνεχὲς ἢ ἁpiλῶς ἢ µάλιστά γε τὸ φύσει καὶ µὴ ἁφῇ µηδὲ δεσµῷ (καὶ τούτων µᾶλλον
ἓν (20) καὶ piρότερον οὗ ἀδιαιρετωτέρα ἡ κίνησις καὶ µᾶλλον ἁpiλῆ) ἔτι τοιοῦτον καὶ µᾶλλον τὸ
ὅλον καὶ ἔχον τινὰ µορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, µάλιστα δ’ εἴ τι φύσει τοιοῦτον καὶ µὴ βίᾳ, ὥσpiερ ὅσα κόλλῃ
ἢ γόµφῳ ἢ συνδέσµῳ, ἀλλὰ ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῷ τοῦ συνεχὲς εἶναι.
130This seems to be connected with discussions on Plato’s Timaeus, in which the soul famously is
defined as a natural bond in the cosmos: Ti. 34b-36d.
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Werner Jaeger has argued that book Ι originally was not connected with books
Ζ,Η,Θ because, according to Jaeger, it does not proceed with the methods that
were introduced in books Ζ, Η, Θ.131 However, although book Ι follows another
methodological line, it adds to the pathways to knowledge that have been explored
in books Ζ, Η, Θ.
Neither in book Ι nor in book ∆ does Aristotle use the example of the Iliad
that functions in Ζ 4 and Η 6 as a school example for a mere continuous external
unity.
Interestingly, no reference is made by this example (here in Ζ 4, as well as
in Η 6, and in APo II, 10) to discussions that are mirrored and taken up in the
poetologically-central parts of the Poetics as we have it today. There, the Iliad
and its specific form of unity is contrasted to weaker poems that realize looser
kinds of unity. The Iliad and Odyssey function here as paradigms for the best
kind of poetry, which accomplishes not only a shallow kind of unity (as the epic
poems which we today call Cyclic Epics), but a unity that is constituted through the
composition of one action.132 Such poetological and philological considerations
and questions do not form the background to Ζ 4. Aristotle does not presuppose
any knowledge about good or bad composition techniques. To be sure, the Iliad
will have been known to virtually every reader and student in the 4th century
B.C., and it will have been known as one large poem with numerous lines, which
nevertheless form a unity because they are built as a continuous narrative. There
is no reflex whatsoever in the entire lectures on Metaphysics, as we have it today,
of any of the discussions that we find in the Poetics.
But, the same holds true of the grammatical passages in the Poetics (ch. 20-22),
where Aristotle uses the Iliad as an example in exactly the same way as in the
Metaphysics and in the Posterior Analytics:
“A sentence is a composite significant sound, some of the parts of which have a
certain significance by themselves. It may be observed that a sentence is not always
made up of noun and verb; it may be without a verb, like the definition of man; but
it will always have some part with a certain significance by itself. In the sentence
‘Cleon walks’, ‘Cleon’ is an instance of such a part. A sentence is said to be one in
two ways, either as signifying one thing, or as a union of several speeches made into
one by conjunction. Thus the Iliad is one speech by conjunction of several; and the
definition of man is one through its signifying one thing. (Po. ch. 20, 1457a23-30
(esp. 28-30), transl. B. Jowett) 133
131Jaeger 1923, 96.
132Po. ch. 8, 1451a18-35.
133λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σηµαντικὴ ἧς ἔνια µέρη καθ’ αὑτὰ σηµαίνει τι (οὐ γὰρ ἅpiας λόγος ἐκ
ῥηµάτων καὶ ὀνοµάτων σύγκειται, οἷον ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώpiου ὁρισµός, ἀλλ’ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥηµάτων
εἶναι λόγον, µέρος µέντοι ἀεί τι σηµαῖνον ἕξει) οἷον ἐν τῷ βαδί- ζει Κλέων ὁ Κλέων. εἷς δέ ἐστι
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The use of this example in the course of the poetic theoretical and methodological
discussions seems to support the idea that the Poetics as we have it is a com-
pound of originally independent treatises or text passages134 with partly rather
loosely connected parts. In fact, when using this example in the context of his
introduction of grammatical or assertoric issues as far as they are relevant for
poetical questions, Aristotle does nothing to connect this notion of unity with the,
so to speak, ‘poetic unity’ that was established as a key concept of his own Poetics.
This observation strongly suggests that the example as it is used in ch. 20 (and
in Metaphysics Ζ 4 and Η 6 and Posterior Analytics, II, 10) has other origins than
Aristotle’s poetological theory, which are naturally located in grammatical fields
or fields of predicational theory.
This is supported by the argumentation in the treatise On interpretation, where
Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of unities; one which is derived from
the one meaning of an assertion, the other by a connection of more than one
(simple) sentence/assertion.
“A single statement-making sentence is either one that reveals a single thing or
one that is single in virtue of a connective. There are more than one if more things
than one are revealed or if connectives are lacking.” (de int. 17a15-17, transl. J. L.
Ackrill)135
Since Aristotle speaks of a “first (kind of) sentence/assertion” that is built only
by the simple connection of noun and verb, it is clear that the unity through a
conjunction is considered as a secondary kind of unity and connection.136
Aristotle in this context refers to parallel problems in the discipline that deals
with definition practices and different kinds of being:
“To explain why ‘two-footed land animal’ is one thing and not many belongs to a
different inquiry.” (de int. 17a13-15, transl. Ackrill)137
λόγος διχῶς, ἢ γὰρ ὁ ἓν σηµαίνων, ἢ ὁ ἐκ piλειόνων συνδέσµῳ, οἷον ἡ ᾿Ιλιὰς µὲν συνδέσµῳ εἷς, ὁ
δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώpiου τῷ ἓν σηµαίνειν.
134Cf. Pierre Swiggers and Alfons Wouters, Grammatical Theory in Aristotle’s Poetics. Chapters
XX, in: iidem (ed.): Grammatical Theory and Philosophy of Language in Antiquity. Leuven/Paris
2002, 101-120; and ibidem, Nikolay P., Grammar of Poetry (Aristotle and Beyond), 71-100, esp. 74;
Gerald F.Else: Aristotle’s Poetics: The argument. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1957,
567 even omitted chapters 19-22 from his commentary because they “have very little, astonishing
little, connection with any other part of Aristotle’s theory on poetry”.
135ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀpiοφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἓν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συνδέσµῳ εἷς, piολλοὶ δὲ οἱ piολλὰ καὶ µὴ ἓν
ἢ οἱ ἀσύνδετοι.
136Cf. Ammon. in de int. 73,15-18 who emphasizes that the unity through a conjunction is a
secondary (and weaker) kind of unity.
137διότι δὲ ἕν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ’ οὐ piολλὰ τὸ ζῷον piεζὸν δίpiουν, —οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ σύνεγγυς εἰρῆσθαι
εἷς ἔσται,— ἔστι δὲ ἄλλης τοῦτο piραγµατείας εἰpiεῖν.
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Again, he distinguishes between simple connection and continuity on the one hand,
and real primary unity that results from the relatedness to one thing on the other.
The reference aims at either books Ζ and Η of the Metaphysics (especially Ζ 4-5)
and Η 6, where Aristotle talks about degrees of unity in definition or definitory
practices,138 and to the definitory theory in the Posterior Analytics. In a different
way than in the Rhetoric, where the conjunction is only considered as a stylistic
means, the argumentation in On interpretation is much more entangled and refers
to the ontological discussions in first philosophy.
Therefore, a complex of inter- and intraconnected texts and argumentations
becomes transparent where the Iliad plays the role of a simple, externally-fabrica-
ted continuous unity through conjunctions – an example that is most likely to be
originally situated in grammatical or predicational contexts that are – as a starting
point – re-used in the Metaphysics and in the philosophy of science of the Posterior
Analytics. The specific task of the Poetics, which is rather irrelevant for students of
philosophy and/or ontology and logic, seems not to be further connected to this
complex – an observation that is supported by the lack of any reception or any
information of reception whatsoever of the Poetics in antiquity and in the contexts
of the philosophical schools of late antiquity.
In regard to the Poetics itself it seems as if Aristotle did not feel the necessity
to look for another example in his short version of assertoric theory in ch. 20
of the Poetics, probably because taking the Iliad as an example of continuous
unity was such a common practice that it could be presupposed as a school
knowledge on the part of his audience and would not have attracted the attention
of the audience or invoked any controversy about the poetic unity, the systasis ton
pragmaton, which was the predominant focus in the Poetics for which the Iliad
and Odyssey function as outstanding paradigms.
In the Metaphysics, the reference to Platonic texts is a driving force for concep-
tual distinctions: This is the case in the concluding argument of Ζ 4: Since every
being has a certain kind of unity, Aristotle concludes his argumentation for now,
and since it is practical to distinguish being according to the categories, we can
describe the particular degree of unity that is realized in (first) substances, in the
category of quality, of quantity etc.139 Ps.-Alexander remarks in his commentary
on book Ι that the distinction between different kinds of unity is a particular
platonic view;140 this is now entangled with the fundamental analytical tool of
the categories and with the concept of commutability of unity and being that was
138This interpretation is supported by Ammonius’ commentary on de int: 71,4-7: ἀναβάλλεται
τὴν τούτων piαράδοσιν εἰς τελειοτέραν τινὰ piραγµατείαν, ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα ᾗ ὄντα ἐστὶν
ἐpiισκοpiεῖν. διόpiερ ἔν τε τῷ ἑβδόµῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ βιβλίῳ τῆς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ piολὺν piερὶ
τούτου piοιήσεται λόγον,...
139Again, we find the shortened list of the categories: cf. 1030a19.20.
140Alex.Aphr.in Metaph.602,2-12.
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discussed in book Γ.
5 Conclusions
All this leads to the insight that our notion of book units is much stricter and
more static than that of Aristotle in his school writings. For, in the case of the
Iliad -paradigm, Aristotle did not bother about the difference between the Iliad as
an example for a real poetic unity on the one hand and the Iliad as a grammatical
example for a simple continuous unity on the other, in the frame of one and the
same discipline and lecture.
At the same time, in this and other cases he transgressed the borders of his
disciplines by frequent cross-references between the treatises and by transferring
examples and notions from one discipline to another. In this process the example
is newly contextualized and modified according to the argumentational needs of
the new context.
If we take the perspective of Aristotle’s audiences and the focus on the school
and communicative practices, then the discussion on the original composition
and connection between texts or text parts is not pivotal. What is crucial is rather
the analysis of the communication practices that deliberately, and as a structural
aspect of these practices, go beyond the boundaries of the particular disciplines or
treatises.141 In this paper I have collected material that proves that it is not likely
that Aristotle either produced a written text or gave a lecture which was recorded
afterwards. We are rather compelled to think of a dynamic interaction between
written and oral practices in which Aristotle constantly revised an original order
of arguments by adding further objections and additional perspectives which
resulted from oral discussions or comments on the written text that might have
circulated in a smaller school circle. These additions may have been noted down
as amendments of the first drafts in the original papyrus roll until the amount of
additions and corrections called for another transcription.
However, the texts from Metaphysics Ζ 4 are in multiple ways connected with
terms, methods and texts from the logical writings.142 Aristotle presupposes
several times that his audience or readership will have been acquainted with these
basic tools for the philosopher and scientist. These references are not restricted to
141Papyrus rolls will have been much easier to handle for everyday purposes if they were not
long (Plinius secundus, N.H. XIII, 23-24 reports details about papyrus quality and maximum sizes.
This of course does not mean that for every purpose the maximum size will have been in use or
practical.) Therefore, it is plausible to assume that Aristotle could have used more than one roll
even for shorter treatises. This procedure would have provided the opportunity to connect and
dissociate certain parts of a text.
142Myles Burnyeat has pointed this out for the whole book Ζ with different implications: Burnyeat
2001, 25 and 87-125.
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treatises that are more easily accessible like the subject matter of the Categories
or of On interpretation or are rather directed at students of communicative
practices (according to a generic meaning of dialectic and rhetoric) that are at
least potentially useful beyond the walls of philosophical schools. However, they
connect the ontological and predicational questions of book Ζ explicitly with the
theory of knowledge and knowledge acquisition and learning (as we find it in the
Posterior Analytics). Therefore, the full impact of the arguments and the different
approaches and tentative pathways to knowledge of ‘being qua being’ will not have
been accessible to an audience that is not familiar with the different branches of
Aristotelian logic and his theory of learning and true knowledge.
The fact that there are not only so many cross-references but that these cros-
s-references apply the notions or insights to the particular context and through
these new contextualizations or re-contextualizations change or re-think them,
shows that the intended audience of Ζ 4 will have been very well-educated and
experienced in pivotal Aristotelian methodological moves. The sometimes small
moves and slight changes in the different questions suggest that these well-pre-
pared audiences themselves actively participated in the argumentational process
that was designed to train the audiences to build their knowledge by and through
themselves.
This proves to produce interesting results especially in the case of references
to Plato and the expression of a critical revision of Platonic issues, because in
these cases different partisanships or different accentuations from the side of
the audiences could have produced different objections or provocations. But not
only critique and confutation become an issue, but also the merging of different
methodological approaches that thus prove to be compatible or even especially
helpful for an audience that reads or listens to both Aristotelian logic and Platonic
dialogues. We have to take into account the primary contexts in which the au-
diences were philosophically educated. The objections and additional arguments
that are incorporated into the argumentational flow can reflect the preconditions
of the audiences and momentary needs for demarcating the boundaries bet-
ween what is Platonic and what is Aristotelian thought in the face of a particular
audience.
This approach can help to understand the differences in tone and content that
we find in the critical references to Platonic concepts and texts: one and the same
Aristotle can feel the need to map out the specific and significant insights and
perspectives of his philosophical work to a different degree in front of different
audiences and in different teaching situations. In order to understand these
individual moves the presupposed knowledge of particular Platonic, Academic or
Aristotelian texts and discussions in the arguments of the treatises of the Corpus
Aristotelicum is pivotal. If Aristotle uses elliptic references or arguments, we can
deduce that he expects his audience to be well-acquainted with problems or texts.
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If he is very explicit in the exposition of an argument, it is likely that the intended
audience is expected to have litte or no knowledge or acquaintance with a certain
type of argument or discussion.
In any case, by following the references and practices of transfer of arguments
and examples we observe Aristotle in his communicative practices and discover
him as deeply involved in the discussion with partners who are acquainted with
Academic discourses. And we observe that the philosopher concentrates on his
audiences and their need for specific arguments and reasons. This is not the
solitudinarian that Werner Jaeger suspected (“ein ganz für sich Lebender, ein
Einsiedler, nach einem eignen Ausdruck ein in sich zurückgezogenes Ich”) in
his interpretation of fragment 668 (Rose). By considering and contextualizing
treatises from the Corpus Aristotelicum and following the philosophical argu-
ments themselves it is possible to gain a revised image of the political and social
involvement of Aristotle. At the same time the analysis of the cross-references
and intra-textual entanglements – which, together with the analysis of external
texts and other material and narratives, is the backbone of the audience-driven
approach – prove directly helpful for the understanding of the philosophical
argument itself.
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